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Dtflnitlon of thg Problta
Until quite recently the oein ailitaxy interest end concern of
Host Anerieasis has been the treaenctous pover and destructive capability
of theraenuclear veapons. Today, however, the Aaeriean people are
becoaing increas ii^i ly concerned by a threat at the opposite extreae of
the spectnm of ailitaiy violence. This is the problem of unconven-
tional narffeire as practiced against the underdeveloped nations of the
Tiorld,
Unconventional war is the war that is beii^j fought today in South
Viet laai it is the war that the French fought in Indochina, the British
in Malaya, and the war that has been fought in such places as Greece,
Laos, Cuba, and the Philippines since World Var ZI. Because it encom-
passes that broad and shadoi^ area between foroal peace and fomal war,
unconventional warfare defies satisfactory definition. Broadly coiw
$idered, it is that diversity of actions and measures which a people
can bring to bear against an eneoy, either an invader or a govenment,
short of confronting hin fomally on the battlefield. Unconventional
warfare nay consist of violent actions like guerrilla attacks, civil
insurrections, aass riots, sabotage or terroris»—or of such "non-
violent" techniques as propaganda, infiltration, strikes, boycotts, and
espionage.
Since tiae and space limitations do not allow a complete 3tu<^ of
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2that aspect] namely, the use of a politico/ailitaxy fora of guerrilla
warfare, which has been utilized extensively in the Cooounist policy of
expansion since World War II* Guerrilla warfare is that phase of uncon-
ventional warfare which is conducted by predominantly indigenous forces
organized on a paramilitary or militaiy basis to harass and eventxially
defeat the ene^. Mo one method or '^pat" solution has been developed
for c(»nbatting this form of warfare. Each situation must be considered
with regard to its distinctive military, political, social, economic,
and psychological considerations. Howsver, much can be learned by
reviewing the techniques ei^loyed by those who have made use of this
type of warfare in the psist, and certain basic principles do evolve
which can be of some use in combatting guerrilla warfare today.
In this type of undertaking, the historical approach is particu-
larly useful because in no other form of conflict has the human factor
been affected so little by developments in military technology.^ Once
we understand how the guerrilla fights and what he has achieved in the
past, once we know his strengths and his limitations, we will be better
able to estimate vbat he can achieve today and formulate a policy which
will limit his effectiveness.
Accordingly, the present candidate plans to present a historical
review of guerrilla warfare with emphasis on the principles, tactics,
strategy, and limitations of this type of violence. I will then present
four case studies concerning the use of guerrilla %farfare as a means of
iFor amplifying information on the effects of advances in military
technology on guerrilla warfare see James £. Cross, Conflict in the
Shadows (Garden City, New Yorkj Doubleday & Company, Inc., lf5377"Ch. VI.
l^^sd "• f iw Sis jfcno^ ^Ki'-^'H ^-f-'! tii'< tr^i; r.'^^iir f;irf \?cr?f aw soao ,:tE6c
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3^ypsnsion by the Ccaaraunist powers since World War II • Three of these
case studies, Malaya, the Philippines and Greece, are examples of suc-
cessful ant i- guerrilla actions from which a great deal can be learned.
The fourth, Indochina, is included to show the effectiveness of this
type of warfare and the disastrous results which follow from an inef-
fective ant i-guerrilla policy. The case studies will not attempt to
give a complete chronological history of the guerrilla action, but
rather, will concentrate on those policies and procedures which were
used effectively in combatting the guerrilla problem. Based upon this
information, the candidate will then attempt to formulate an effective
framework for ant i- guerrilla policy in the twentieth century.
This thesis will be primarily concerned with the containment of
guerrilla activity after it has broken out into open warfare, and will
deal only briefly with the problems of developing nations and the
political and economic conditions %rtiich give rise to guerrilla activity.^
It will, however, not be a discussion of military tactics, as it will
attempt to show that the most successful means for combatting guerrilla
operations can be found primarily on the political level.3 A secondary
effort of this thesis will be to discuss scMote of the policy implications
which apply to the United States as an interested third party in the
fight against Communist expansion.
%or information on the problems and possible solutions associated
with developing countries, the writer recommends the following: Max F.
Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer (eds.). The Emerging Mat ions (Bostom
Little, Brown and Coi^)aiQr, 196l)| or W. W, Rostow, The Stages of Economic
Growthi A Mon-Communist Manifesto (Cambrldgej CaiaErldge University
Press, IS^OTT
^For information on the purely military aspects of guerrilla and
csesri^ 'Jff ^^r!T .II TJi¥ biioW aonle aiawoq ^«irtwaBo3 add t"* noi«n«pw
.bamssX set nso Issb icaig « rt&i/tvf hioil etioiooa BlXl-nsi;8-l^nB Ii/t8e»9
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kThg Conten^aorary Threat
Vl^, at this point in history^ do the Coonunists turn to unconvtt»*
tional varfara and guerrilla tactics as aajor techniques for esq^anding
their control? Six characteristics in the conteioporary period lend
support to their venture and explain why they have been able to acccMft-
plish so ouch with so little in aany areas of the world. These charac-
teristics arei
1. A aajor war in the nuclear age has becoac exceedingly dan-
gerous, Khrushchev has acknovledged the insanity of general nuclear
conquest and, at least for the public record, has e3q)ressed fears that
local vars aay grov into themonuolear imrs.'^ While the general strate-
gic balance of terror today increases the dangers to the Co«aunist bloc
of resorting to direct aggression and creating Soviet-Western nilitaxy
confrontations, it reduces the risks involved in indirect, unconven-
tional var« Khrushchev, therefore, pledges Connunist support to that
form of conflict which offers ouch at little cost and little dangert
What is the attitude of the Harxists toward such uprisings?
A most positive one • • • • These are uprisings against rotten
counter- guerrilla operations, the following are recoamendedt U. S.
Marine Corps, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces FMre-21 (Washingtont
Qovenawnt Printing Office^ 1962) j U. S, Amy, Operations Against
Irregular Forces FK 31-'l5 (Waahingtom U.S. QovemnenF'Prlntlng
bffice, 1961) J U, S, Amy, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Opera-
tions FM 31-21 (Washingtont U. S. Govemnent Printing Office, 1961).
^ikiU S. Khrushchev, "For Hew Victories of the World Coonunist
Noveoent," Insurgency and Counter in3urgency i An Anthology , Richard M.
Leighton and Ralph Sanders, editors (Washington! Industrial College
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reactionary regimes, against the colonizers* The Coonounist fully
support such Just wars and march in the front rank with the peoples
waging liberation struggles.
5
While it is clear froii- oviet discourse and action that they
favor such wars in principle and do support them in some concrete cases,
this support is not ixnqualified or xiniversal. Such, unfortunately, is
not the case for the Chinese ^^Oiiu^iunlsts. The current Sino-Soviet dis-
pute has brought to the surface significant differences in the current
Chinese and Russian approaches to revolutionary war. The divergence
between them arises from tlie fact that the Soviets are more cautious
than the Chinese in evaluating the risks that they believe the Communist
bloc should assvime in overt support of revolutionary viars. Further, the
Soviet leaders generally prefer the use of subversion, or other non-
violent means, to the use of guerrilla war, because the seizure of power
by indigenous revolutionary forces tends to make local Communist rulers
too independent of Moscow* s control. For these reasons, the Soviets do
not have the missionary zeal of the Chinese Communists concerning
guidance on the tactics and operations of revolutionary guerrilla waz^
fare or for its direct support. It can be e^qpected that in the future
the Chinese Communists are likely to be the guiding spirit in most
Connunist revolutionary guerrilla wars*
2, The second reason which prompts the Communist to use guerrilla
tactics in the contemporary period is that Western Europe's phenomenal
political and economic resurgence makes the prospect for Communist
success in this area quite remote. During the early stages of the
%bld., p. 106.
^ 'gi
n^ iiTi^iii itoqpim ob bcfl - irq ni siavr rioya iovbI
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6Conuaunist's postwar search for safe and profitable vays to expand their
areas of power, they placed high hopes on the Communist parties of the
industrialized nations of Uestem Europe. However, the defeat of the
Italian and French Conmunists parties at the polls, the Greek Contomnists
in the field, coupled with the rising power of MTO and the economic re-
birth of Europe soon proved these hopes illusory. It was then entirely
natural for the more general emphasis of the over-all struggle to shift
away from Europe to what are cooononly called the underdeveloped nations.
These nations, as we shall show later, are ideal targets for Communist
infiltration and subversion, and a large number of them are topographi*
cally and climatically well suited to guerrilla operations.
3. The world is passing through an epoch of disintegrating
colonial empires and sprouting many independent, newly developing
countries. The Communists have been able to exploit effectively the
pent-up hatreds against former colonial powers and the pent-up frustra-
tions associated with the slow pace of economic advancement. Further,
old societies are changing their ways in order to create and maintain a
national personality on the world scene and to bring to their peoples
the benefits modern technology can offer. The introduction of this
technology brings about not merely new methods of production but a new
style of family life, the beginnings of national politics, and a new
relationship to the world outside. This process is truly revolutionary
and millions throughout the world are experiencing a breakdown in tra-
ditional patterns of life. The Bppesils of Comaunism in such societies
are related to the quest for a "sense of belonging," and the potential
recruits to c<»munism are those rootless people who have turned their
h-% ^.rf i '.;:f?4>ft o^t •:;\r(p.
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7backs on the traditional values of tteir forefathers but have not been
able to become a part of the new emerging world. Conounism has great
appeal for these people because it, more than any other political move-
ment, represents a total way of life. They believe that by identifying
themselves with Communism they will be able to move Into the modern
world and become a part of a sophisticated movement with world-wide
significance. Such people are not necessarily blinded to the costs and
risks of associating with Communism, but they feel that the rewards may
be more in line with effort In the Communist Party than elsewhere in
their society.
k* In many lands a glaring gap exists between the elite and the
people, between the village and the national government. In fact, there
is little dialogue between the villagers and the officials In the capi-
tals. This condition leads to a lack of identification by the peasant
with the national government and often results in instability. The
CooKinists are ever willing to fill this vacuum. Further, it is a mis-
take to think that the existence of guerrillas is positive proof that
the government is unpopular and, therefore, not worth supporting. This
idea may be valic in the more developed parts of the world, but In many
parts of the world, states are underdeveloped in the political-adminis-
trative sense as well as economically. The number of people are few 1^0
have the training to perform the standard civil service Jobs that we
take for granted. Lacking that "steel frame" in which India takes such
J\ist pride, a government appears as a weak and distant entity to most
villagers, except when it serves as a l^urdensome tax collector. In most
lands, at least half the people are indifferent to a goverraient and the
-svoai i«oi;JUoq U s^c -J lol JjBsaqa
i?3i;t .'S/:Jbs:. iJi;M-j. I'^-ti . •
;i . -ocJdsUoo x6.* ^- « advise ^1 narfw ^qs»ox» ^zisbjbIIIv
effectiveness of an Indifferent population toward the success of a
jjuerrilla operation \ms pointed out by Lawrence of Arabia decades agot
It (the rebel aovemcnt) must have a friendly population, not
actively friendly but syi^athetlc to the point of not betraying
rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2 per
cent active in a striking force, and 98 per cent passively
sympathetic.^
Thus, guerrilla warfare, especially when mounted from an external
base, is a terrible burden to carry for any government in a society
which is making its way towards modernization.
$, The Communists have learned thoroughly the techniques of
gaining control of the civil population hy combining effectively the
positive incentives of a political doctrine, applied meticulously from
the grass roots up, and the negative pressures of a terrorism applied
against those who refuse to accept their leadership voluntarily. There
is no denying that the small but disciplined cadres of the national
Communist parties are extremely adaptable and effective tools of
politics, anc his is proving particularly true in the underdeveloped
areas where shifts of attitude toward political authority and tradi-
tional trays are likely to be the most sudden and e>qplosive. These
groups are well suited to identify with, and act on, popular grievances
and to stir up considerable unrest. In most of the underdeveloped
countries there have been plenty of ready-made grievances with tdiich to
work. These minorities have demonstrated that by e:>q3loiting existing
tensions, they can, over time and with adequate outside assistance and
°T. £. Lawrence, "Guerrilla Warfare," Encyclopaedia Britannica
(1957 ed,), X, 95QC.
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9support, build an aggressive military opposition that may finally
destroy the governiaent's ability to govern and thus reduce the country
to a velter of confusion and civil war.
6, The Conaunists have mastered the principles and techniques of
guerrilla vrarfare, a form of warfare quite apart from regular or frontal
warfare. It is this final characteristic which this writer feels is the
key to the C(»munist success. Therefore, it will be useful to take a
closer look at this fonn of warfare, in particular as a technique in
past and possibly future aggressions.
I 7 / f




What we now call guerrilla warfare is as old as mankind. Well-
known examples of guerrilla operations are to be found as far back as
360 B.C. in China. During the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, and
Caesar, the resistance of small bands to regular soldiery constituted an
in^ortant form of military conflict. Practically no major conflict was
fought after the mid-l8th century without the impact of irregular
participation being felt.
American colonial warfare developed some excellent irregular
fighters, such as the celebrated Rogers Rangers. Ve also had an out-
standing guerrilla fighter in Francis Marion, "the Swamp Fox," who was
responsible for considerable inconvenience to Cornwall is. The term
"guerrilla i^jsrfare," however, did not pass into the military vocabulary
until after the French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in I807, when
Spanish irregular forces played a large role in the defeat of Napoleon.
By definition, the word "guerrilla" means a "little war."
Between l8llt and World War I, guerrilla campaigns were waged in
many parts of the world. Mexican guerrillas seriously hampered Scott's
awvements in the Mexico City Campaigni there were fine guerrilla leaders
on both sides in our Civil War, chief among them being Col. John S.
Mosby, Col. James H. Wilson, and Jesse McNcill| the winning of the West
was a lengthy guerrilla fightj the British fought such bands in several
VS'VU^. [
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out-of-the-way corn«r3 of the Empirej and the Russians engaged the
TurkcM&an tribes in various guerrilla battles*
Historically, the irregular has usually been defending his
country against foreign invasion. The twentieth century, however, has
brought two other functions mors clearly into vlewj the guerrilla may be
a weapon of insurrection, aiming at the cstpture of political power) or
he may be the instrument of foreign aggression* These functions are not
new in themselves. People discontented with their government and agents
of foreign powers have often been involved in violent uprisings that
used xinorthodox military tactics. What is ccmparatively new is the
development of a body of theory that has systematized the technic^e of
using guerrilla varfare for the seizure of national or international
power and has placed the irregular among the weapons systems of modem
war*
Colonel T* £• Lawrence, leader of the Arab guerrilla campaign
against the Turks in World War I, was the first of the new "leader-
theorists" to have appeared in the twentieth centuxy. Lawrence was the
first man to reduce guerrilla warfare to a set of rules* He wrote an
article for one of the leading reference works and reduced his views on
guerrilla warfare to final form* He almost converted the tactics of the
guerrilla to a science and claimed that no enemy could occupy a country
ea^loying guerrilla warfare unless every acre of land could be occupied
with troops.
His work, however, was appreciated more In Russia and China than
among his own people. The spread of Communism saw the basically military
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radically expanded and altered guerrilla warfare. Writing shortly after
Lawrence, Lenin adapted guerrilla warfare to the business of world revo-
lution and destruction.^ But he was not the only Red leader to write on
guerrilla warfare. A soon-to-be famous Chinese wrote a short discussion
of guerrilla warfare In 1937 that is one of the classics in this field. *-
At the time he wrote, Mao Tse-tung was somewhat less to be feared than
today, which qualifies him as the prime example of the local guerrilla
making good.
During World War II, the allies received untold aid from partisan
and guerrilla forces irtiich sprang i^ in practically every country that
the Nazis or the Japanese occupied. General Eisenhower thought the
assistance rendered by the French '^Hac^is" during the allied landing in
France equal to at least twelve divisions.^ Tito's partisans tied down
an average of thirty German divisions in Yugoslavia. The Soviet partisan
laovement, which arose in the wake of the German invasion, was one of the
greatest irregular resistance movements in the history of warfare.
During the two years the Soviets conducted this partisan type of ac-
tivity, they claim to have killed more than 300,000 Germans, including
30 generals, 6,336 officers, and 520 airmen) they also claim the derail-
ment of 3>000 trains, the destruction of 3>262 railway and highway
^V, I. Lenin, "On Partisan Warfare," Insurgency and Counter-
Insurgencyt An Anthology , Richard M. Leighton and RalpTTsanders , editors
CWashingtow Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1962), pp. 113-122.
•Mao Tse-tung, On the Protracted War (Pekingi Foreign Language,
19514)
.
3joseph P. Kutger, "Irregular Warfare In Transition," Modem
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bridges, 1,191 tanks and armored cars, U,027 trucks, and 895 dumps and
varehouses.'^
The allies during World War II vere by no means the sole bene-
ficiaries of the irregular type of varfare« Perhaps the most legendary
figure to come out of the var vas the German soldie]>adventurer. Otto
Skorzeny, whose exploits ranged from the recapture of Mussolini, the
abduction of Admiral Horthy, the destruction of the fiyavsgen bridge, to
the command of special squads of soldiers dressed in American uniforms
and fluent in English, whom Hitler planned to use to create confusion
behind the enemy's front.
The end of World War II did not mean the end of gxaerrilla action.
With a battle-tested technique, the Reds utilized guerrilla tactics in
Bumy parts of the world. China, Greece, Malaya, the Philippine Islands,
Indochina and various lesser guerrilla actions show how they have
attempted to use the guerrilla method to undermine their enemies. It
would be the most dangerous kind of thinking for the West to minimize
these movements singly because they seem to partake more of the nature of
robbery and arson than regular warfare. What the Communist leaders have
done is to make a simple military estimate of the situation and launch
an attack on the part of the West that offers the best chance of success,
with the least cost and effort. Men such as Mao, General Giap, and most
Guerrilla Warfare , Franklin M. Osanka (ed.), (New Yorki The Free Press
of Glencoe, 1962)
, p. U6.
^, Aubrey Oixon and Otto Heilbrunn, Communist Guerrilla Warfare
(Mew Yorkt Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), p. ^"I
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recently Ctw Guevara have extended Clausewitz^s analysis of the armed
pcqjulace as a ailltaiy instrtoacnt, to Include the use of irregulars for
political purposes.
What can these men teach ns7 They have described the conditions
under i^ich guerrilla warfare can be initiated and sustained* They have
analyzed both the techniques and the objectives of guerrilla warfare.
Finally, perhaps surprisingly, they have revealed the inherent limita-
tions of this form of combat* Let us pass on to a study of some of these
basic principles of guerrilla warfare*
The Principles of Guerrilla War
The principles of guerrilla war, like those of regular war, are
immutable J however, they can be applied in a variety of combinations.
The guerrilla cannot ignore the general principles of military strategy,
but in addition to these, he is governed by several criteria which are
I«culiar to him. Three of these criteria are: (1) the environment,
(2) cotamunity stJ5>port, and (3) Division of Functions*
The Environment . Tim guerrilla is most often native to the area
in which he operates. This gives him two distinct advantages. First,
i^n he is not fighting, he may blend in with the surrounding population,
and second, he will have an intimate knowledge of the terrain in i^ich
he operates. The tactical advantage of such conditions is obvious*
Seeking out an enemy who can be easily disguised, trtio knows the trails
fl^ the shortcuts, and vho is familiar with remote hiding places, the
most promising spots for ambushes, and the surest escape routes from any
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Querrllia operations are most successful irtierever regular araies
are hampered in their oovements by topographical obstacles such as
Jungles, mountains, deserts, and delta country. This, unfortunately, is
the type of terrain which predoninates in the greater part of the so-
called "underdeveloped areas." The environment, however, cannot be
conceived of merely in geographical terms, even though it may be signifi-
cant. Environment also embraces climate, the road and comnuni cat ions
network, local economic conditions, the location of villages and towns,
and the attitudes of the indigenous population. Further, tte external
environment may often prove even more important than the internal one.
The full potential of a guerrilla movement is seldom realized until it
receives assistance frtm external sources. Territorial contiguity with
independent states friendly to the insurgents si^lifies the problem of
siq^plying the guerrillas with war material and flemishes to the guer-
rillas a convenient avenue of temporary retreat to a safe hsvesi, &r
"sanctuary."
CoiMaLUiity Support . A guerrilla force can neither survive nor
function without community stxpport. He must initially rely almost
exclusively on the local community for all the ismediate nece sities of
war—food, clothing, shelter, funds, cover, and moat in^rtantly, i»-
telligence. Because Uie guerrilla cannot fight except on his own terms,
he must know enough about the enemy's plans and movements to avoid being
trapped into battles which he cannot win, and enough of the eneayM weak
spots to make his own strikes as safe and effective as possible. There
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exists no better soxirce of infomatlon to a guerrilla noveaent than a
friendly population.
Mao Tse-tung has stated that, "Because guerrilla warfare basi-
cally derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither
exist nor flourish if it separates itself froa their sympathies and co-
operation."^ Because the civilian populace is willing to provide the
guerrilla with the necessities of life, he is able to travel about
without being too much concerned with a great many of the logistical
problems which are always with the regular armies. Further, the guer-
rilla can convert his reliance on the civilian population into an ad-
vantage. Because he cannot hold ground or do large-scale damage to
eneqy forces, his objective becomes control of the population. Ik
pursues this objective not only by politically organizing and indoc-
trinating the people, but also by educating his own men in their role of
vinnir^9 civilian svqpport. As we shall show later, Mao and his cohorts
have become e:q>erts in this field.
Division of Functions . Successful guerrilla operations demand a
complex organization, which can be constructed only with patient, pains-
taking effort. The general headquarters exercises absolute centralized
control of policy, ethics, and political ideology. The actual conduct
and basic responsibility for operations Is decentralized to the guex^
rilla band leader. However, political commissars are part of the
command structure down to the platoon level and sometimes lower. When
^Samuel B. Griffith, Mao Tse-Tung On Guerrilla Warfare (Hew Yorki
Frederick A. Praeger, 196I), p. THu
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It coaca to priorities of military or political objectives, the politi-
cal ccNnmissar has the final vord,
CKierrilla warfare is carried on Irry both full-time and part-^tiae
personnel. The full-time fighter often makes a co»^lete break vlth
co«munity life and withdraws to the jungle or the mountains for training.
Indoctrination, and milltazy operations* As the movement gains prestige,
it will usually establish a formal organizational structure, replete with
uniformed units and raiUis, which will help to give the movement the
appearance of a ** going concern." The part-time guerrilla, however,
cannot afford the luxury of recognition as a soldier. He does not with-
draw from cosmunity life$ In fact, his effectiveness depends \ipon his
ability to lead two lives. By living in the community and remaining in
daily contact with the enemy, part-time guerrillas are well adapted to
carry out indispensable missions of intelligence and covert sabotage.
Basic Guerrilla Tactics
The phrase "hit and run" sums up the tactical doctrine of guer-
rilla forces. This doctrine is based on what might be called the nega-
tive offensive. Guerrillas refuse the challenge to |M>sitional c(»Bbat|
they do not seek to engage in decisive battles and avoid contact with
major elements of enemy forces. Surprise is their rraiin tactic. Guer-
rillas strike suddenly and unexpectedly. They disengage themselves frtna
contact with the enemy and retreat to their hideout with corresponding
suddenness since their objective is to achieve a quick decision. If
this does not develop, there is nothir^; to be gained by prolonged en-
gagement, nor are the means available for such an engagement. The
:
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guerrilla's mission is accomplished vhen he succeeds In holding the
opposing regular forces in a stalemate or drawing them into a retallan
tory campaign that will consume their resources and adversely affect
their morale.
Mobility, maneuverability, and ability to melt into inaccessible
terrain or Into the population are important qualities In effective
guerrilla tactics. Other necessary characteristics are discipline.
Ingenuity, Spartan living, ability to live off the land, and substantial
reliance on captured arms and equipment. These characteristics allow the
guerrilla to concentrate his forces to achieve local superiority for
sharp attacks and then to disperse In order to shift to another point of
pressure.
The guerrilla cannot afford to fight any losing battles or lose
the Initiative, but sometimes. In the sequence of events, guerrillas are
forced to defend a stronghold to prevent selawre or penetration of an
iD^rtant area. The defense generally Is assumed to gain time or idille
moving to a new base of operations. It Is most unusual for guerrilla
units to defend because by so doing, the elements of mobility and s\ir-
prise are lost. If the defense Is assixmed. It Is done for a limited
time only.
Probably the basic tactics of modern guerrilla warfare can best
be stimmed up In the following words of Mao Tse-Tungt
In guerrilla warfare select the tactic of seeming to come from
the east and attacking from the west| avoid the solid, attack the
hollow; attack| withdraw) deliver a lightning blow, seek a
lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they
withdraw irtien he advances) harass him when he stops | strike him
when he Is wearyj pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla
3i
h/i.
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strategy, the eneiiy*s rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots
are his vital points, ami there he aust be harassed, attacked,
dispersed, exhausted and annihilated.^
Coaaunist Guerrilla strategy
Unce the writings of Mao Tse-tung ara the "Bible** for Cooaunist-
inspired guerrilla uprisings and insurrections, a basic understanding of
his operating aethods and procedures is necessary in order to understand
Coamnist guerrilla strategy.^ >iao*s ailitazy thinking is not a part of
a party line. To be sure, he quotes froa various CoHWunist gospels, but
he also quotes froa Chinese ailitary classics, particularly the work of
Sun Tsu, with which he is thoroughly faailiar, and froa Clausewitz, whoa
he studied in Chinese translation as early as 1926. But essentially, his
theories of war are generalised froa his own experiences as a revol\»>
tionary.
Although Mao never states it quite this \my, the basic premise of
his thcoiy is that political aobilization aay be substituted for Indus*
trial aobiligation with a successful ailitary outcome. In order to
explain this statement in greater detail, I shall draw heavily on the
writing of £• L. Katzenbach, who, I feel, has made one of the clearest
analysis of the purpose and strategy behind the writings of Mao Tsetung.®
^Ibid., p. ii6.
'This section will cover a detailed examination of the Ideas of
Mao Tse-tung and a brief look at some of the other guerrilla "leader-
theorists" of the contemporaiy pcriod| namely. General Vo figuyen Gtap
and Che Guevara.
%. L. Katzenbach, "Time, Space, and Willi The Polftico-Military
Views of Mao Tse-tung," The Guerrilla - And How To Fight m», Col. T. N.
Green (ed.), (Vew Yorkt "Trederick A. Praeger, 1*552), pp. U-21.





















Basically, military theory has to do with making the best use of
the available. In broad terms, military doctrine would seem to have
some six components, three of which are tangible, and three of which are
not. Of the tangibles, there are the weapons systeiu, the supply system,
and mar^ower. The three intangibles are space, time, and will. It is
to the last three that the industrial Western world has given the least
thought, and to which Mao has given the most. The reason is simple
enough, for these three factors, plus manpower, added up to the totality
of his exploitable military potential. Weapons and supplies were nar-
rowly restricted. His was a military force bom In the most abject
poverty.
Now to return to the basic premise that political mobilization
may be stibstituted for industrial mobilization with a successful
military outcome, Mao explained this thinking in the form of a ^^jmlles
"The people are like water and the araiy is like fish." "With the common
people of the vhole country mobilized, we shall create a vast sea of
humanity and drown the enemy in it . . . ."^ Mao held that military
salvation flows from the political conversion of the population, but he
was also well aware that such political conversion takes time. His
military problem, then, was how to organize space, the first intangible,
so that it could be made to yield time. His political problem was how
to organize the time so gained that it could be made to yield "will^j
that is, the political indoctrination and favorable support of the
9lbid., p. Ih.
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population. Mao's real problem then v&s not that of getting the var
over with, the question to which Western military thinkers have directed
the greater part of their attention, but that of keeping it going 1"
order to yield the necessary time and will. The solution proposed by
Mao~protracted guerrilla warfare accoapanied by intensive political
indoctrination.
Mao conceived this type of war as passing through a series of
three merging phases. The first phase is devoted to organization, con-
solidation, and preservation of regional base areas situated in isolated
and difficult terrain. Here volunteers are trained and indoctrinated,
and from here, agitators and propagandists set forth to "persuade" and
"convince" the inhabitants of the surrounding countryside and to enlist
their stipport. Military operations are sporadic. The successful small
actionr>-the raid, the ambush, the assassination-"* this is the material
from which militant enthusiasm is woven. But continuous vlct ry ?t this
level of military activity is not a matter of gallantry and glory, but of
caution and self-restraint. Mao recognized that during this phase, the
very price of sxirvival is caution. Operating in such a way, space is
made to yield time.
In the next phase, direct action assumes an ever- increasing
importance. AttaiEks are made on vulnerable military and police outposts}
weak columns are ambushed. This is the stage of true guerrilla warfare.
The primary purpose of these operations is to procure arms, ammunition,
and other essential material. As the growing guerrilla force becomes
better equipped and its capabilities improve, political agents proceed
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be absorbed into the expanding "liberated" area. Thus, time is made to
yield will.
What, according to Mao, has been happening during these first tvo
stages? First, the inevitability of defeat has been wiped from the minds
of the defeatists by the very fact that the war has been continued.
De-fpair has given way to hope, the will to resist has been strengthened,
and the will to win has begun to dawn. Second, by regularly disturbing
the peace, the guerrillas destroy the local legitimacy of the established
order. Inevitably, the distracted villagers will begin making contribu-
tions to the irregulars as insurance for their flocks and harvests.
Because the rebels will withdraw from any region where the government
builds up its forces, and return when the troops are transferred else-
where, much of the population finds itself under two alternating govern-
ments, paying taxes and providing supplies and recruits to whichever
force controls their region at the moment. By such means, the guei>
rillas take the first 3teps toward becoming a respectable government.
Finally, if the government's strength is reduced by the strain of
the guerrilla attacks and if the rebels are able to continue their
political and military build-\jqp, the insurrection moves into what Mao
considers the third stage. It is in^rtant to remember that r4ao never
lost sight of the fact that guerrilla action cannot win wars. Thus,
during this final period, a 5'ignificant percentage of the active guer-
rilla forces complete the transformation into an orthodox establishment
capable of engaging the eneny in conventional battle. The conflict then
becomes a civil war in the classic sense, the guerrilla fighting is
largely over, and the rebels have only to maintain the momenttaa of their
ss
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growth to gain final and coBiplcte control of the country. In such a
way, political mobilization Is laade to yield military success.
With only a few exceptions, the principles of General Vo Nguyen
Qiap, the commander- in?- chief of the North Vietnam Army, closely p?"-^Uel
those of Mao, Like Mao, he places heavy and repeated emphasis on the
rebels' need to gain the full support of the p«o| ie and to establish
firm control over their activities. Giap also divides the campaign into
three stages: a "stage of contention," a "period of equlllbriura," and
finally a "general counteroffensive."^^ Giap's first stage Is the
period of active guerrilla war. The second stage is the period irtien the
guerrillas pirepare to operate as conventional soldiers, Qlap viewed the
decisive third stage as being coursed of several siib-phases and only In
the last of these would there be formal battles, in the traditional
sense.
In Giap's view, even during the final drive to victory, mobility
was to be the key to all operations, offensive as well as defensive.
Like the guerrillas, the regular forces In the final stage were to slip
away when threatened by attack from superior enemy troops and to refuse
to accept battle in unfavorable situations. This emphasis on mobility
can be explained by the fact that in Indochina the transition to the
third stage was a difficult and taxing business when compared with the
experience of the Chinese Comounist. Because of supplies and support
received in World War II, the Chinese Communist, by 19^5, were well
^%iap's views are published In book form. General Vo Nguyen
Glap, People's War People's Army (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962).
l^Ibid., p, 29.
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equipped, wll trained, battle hardened and controlled a large area and
population. They vere veil prepared to enter the third stage. The
Vietainhf on ths other hand, vere seldoia strong enough to accept open
battle vith the French forces. Thus, Oi«p*s principles governed tht
conduct of the actual Vietninh counteroffensive against the French. It
is interesting to note, hovever, that the decisive victory caue i4:feen he
deviated fron his doctrine during the battle at Dlen Bien Fhu and ac-
cepted a static battle situation.
The third and final Cofiwunist 'lisader-theorists" i^u> bears mention
is Che Guevara. His book on the Castrc insurrection in Cuba is a fine
study of muxy phases of guerrilla organisation and tactics, but can add
little to vhat has already b^i^n said concerning Ccwnmist guerrilla
strategy, as his ideas tend to follow those of Hao.^^ Both agree that
guerrilla aovettents grow by unifying diverse bands of irregulars vho
join together in arms to resist a conaon eneayi that the underlying
motivation is not only to right wrongs inflicted by the eneoy (that is
to say, to destroy the existing govemsents), but also to build a nev
and'*justr social order (that is to say, a Coneainist state). While both
Kao and CJuevara sav the implication of their experience in guerrilla
uarfare beycnd their own countries, Guevara presses the i^sue with
typical Latin confidence. To Quavmra, guerrilla warfare is opportunity
(mocking at the deori "Given suitable operating terrain, land, hunger,
en^^y injustices, etc., a hard core of thirty to fifty oen, is in ay
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opinion, enough to initiate armed revolution in B.ny Latin American
country." ^•^
Limitations of Guerrilla Warfare
While laost publicity and discussion Is aJaout the successes which
guerrilla forces have achieved, these irregular orces Imve some definite
limitations in their operating capabilities. First and foremost, it laust
be remembered thit guerrilla warfare is the weapon of the weak. It Is
never chosen in preference to regular warfarej it is employed only when
and where the possibilities of regular warfare have been foreclosed.
The guerrilla force, springing as it does from the civil population, »aay
be composed of individuals irfio have never had any formal military train-
ing. This deficiency severely limits effectiveness, particularly during
the early stages of guerrilla organization. Time, the will of the
leaders, and imported military personnel and technicians may eventually
lessen the seriousness of these deficiencies, but for such a ^roup to
challenge Initially a regular force in anything but a hit-and-run za-
gagement would be to Invite disaster. Therefore, they can only nibble
away at the strength of the government by subversion and irregular
attack. Of necessity, they become guerrilla fighters.
The guerrilla leader is caught on the horns of a peculiar dilemma
in that he must be continually aggressive but must never risk defeat.
Defeat not only hurts his miall, poorly equipped forces, but also
carries the special penalty of weakening his hold on the minds of his
^3lbid., p. 68.
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supporters, both fighters and civilians. But a guerrilla leader irfio
allows offensive activity to slacken likewise runs the risk of weakening
confidence and morale, as well as giving his opponent the chance to
regain the railitazy initiative.
Modem warfare requires the employment of many tools which are
not available to the guerrilla for his use* He may not be able to get
them and, indeed, his type of warfare may preclude his using them.
Guerrillas must often depend on seized arms and equipment and are
usually denied, by non-aval lability of both equipment and technicians,
the use of weapons other than small arms.
Guerrillas are most secure in con^aratively difficult terrain, but
in such areas, they rarely find ample supplies, profitable targets, and
the civilian leaders who must be won over to their cause. Therefore,
the eventual objectives of guerrilla attack and indoctrination must be
the areas of higher population density. But operations in these areas
are extremely dangerous, perhaps impossible, except in the form of
sporadic terrorism and sabotage, and may cost more than they are worth.
Another characteristic which limits the guerrilla operation is
their vulnerability to psychological warfare. The guerrilla commander
leads a band of people who regard themselves as patriotic citizens.
They have no contract to bind them to their duties and may become dis-
heartened and disillusioned with the guerrilla cause if skillful propa-
ganda exploits their failures. For this reason, the guerrilla is
vulnerable to betrayal by members of his organization.
Another aspect of this vulnerability to psychological warfare Is
In regard to external support. Foreign aid is crucial for the eventxxal
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success of any guerrilla operation^ but such aid oay daopen the eaotlons
that provide the fuel for guerrilla warfare, and render the ideological
struggle more difficult. Inevitably, there will be soiae conflict between
the aiias of indigenous guerrillas and their foreign benefactors. The
incumbent power, by use of psychological warfare, will always try to
exploit the facts or legends of foreign support, and thus attack the
very basis of the insurgents* aotives.
Generally, support of the population is won by political persua-
sion and maintained by ailitary success. It may also be necessary to
use coercion or terrorism. The question then arises whether coercion
will intimidate or alienate the civilian population. Terror, less
violent forms of coercion, and even sabotage, if it destroys the liveli-
hood of the poor, may backlash and repei. rather than attract popular
support* Clearly, these techniques must at times be employed by any
guerrilla force, but the problems of when and how to use them, and how
to keep them under control, are extremely difficult ones.
Perhaps the greatest limitation of all in the sticcess of guer-
rilla operations is in the very nature of the tactics they use. The
guerrilla is restricted in his scope of operations by his inability to
concentrate a large force for extended periods of time. Because the
force lives off the civilian population and has little capability for
transporting siqpplies, it may be difficult for the supporters in a local
area to provide the necessary shelter and food for a large group for an
extended period. And even when the guerrilla is able to mass his troops,
he then himself becoaes a lucrative target for attack. For these rea-
sons, guerrillas cannot, by themselves, employing "hit and run" tactics.
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defeat a determined regular aray. They nay help regular forces win
vars; but unless they drop their guerrilla tactics and fight as a
regular azioy^ they cannot force a decision. Thus, Mao's transition to a
third or conventional stage. But here proper timing of the transition
is important. Premature regular ization invites military disaster, but
over- long attachment to irregular operations may exhaust the population.
Sxmmation
As we have seen, the Communists are by no means t^ inventors of
guerrilla warfare. However, they have refined, adapted, and employed
this ancient form of combat with a considerable degree of success in the
contemporary period. This success is primarily due to certain charac-
teristics in our present-day world which make guerrilla warfare a cheap
and fairly safe form of aggression.
Let us now pass on to a review of four case studies involving the
Communist use of guerrilla tactics since World War II. A careful analy-
sis of these case studies, coupled with the just completed review of
guerrilla warfare, should provide us with a basic understanding of the
problem from which we should be able to devise some type of defense
against it.
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In May, I9hi, alUr • gustalMid uid victorious war against the
Italians, Qrsace vas attacked by the Qeraans in strength and suceuobed*
£arly in i9k2, the British dropped Special Operation Executive Agents
into Oreeee to destroy the ii^ortant QergopotoMis bridge. On finding
various Oreek resistance groins, the aj^nts stayed on as liaison offi-
cers* The British urged the various groi:^s to organize into eooaon
resistance organizations against the Qeraans vhich they vould supply.^
Under the banner of resistance against the invader, the Greek Coaaunist
Party, the KKE, asseabled one of the largest such groups into what
appeared originally to be a deoaocratic wtvenent of no specific politi-
cal hue, inspiringly, if aisleadingly, designated the national Liber**
tien Front (knovn generally by the Greek abbreviation, EAM), The araed
forces of cJdi vere known as ^AS—the People's Aray of Liberation. §y
the end of 1?U3> the OAZ forces had about 20,000 guerrillas and a
highly organised underground.
In October, 19itU» Geraan forces vithdrev froa Greece and the
Greek Govenwent- in*Exile, coMposed of representatives froa the aajor
political parties, tncludiiH) the KK£, returned froa Cairo to Athens.
^For a detailed discussion of guerrilla activity in Greece during
Vorld War II see 0. H. Condi t^ Case ?^tudy in Guerrilla Wari Greece
During World %iar II. (Washingtont The Aiierlcan UniversHy, Special
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Otmrtl "^ir Ronald HMKtntU Seotoitt^ CoMiftnd«r of AUUd fore«s in
Gr««ct» «tiieh eoosistcd witnly of British ond « f#ir Qrt«k units « ordered
tht ditbitndaont of all r«sistaiie« grot«ps« Th* £LA5 forcos r«fiasod to
Gomply vith this order and thtir political rapresentativas rasigmd fron
tht govamncnt on Oaeaabar 2* On the follo%fino day, an araad revolt hy
ELkS forees broke out in Athens* For tvo aonths^ eivil Mir raged, hut
the KK£ lias thwarted in its atteapt to seiae control of the 90vema«it|
and vith the signing of the Varkisa Agraeaent, in Februaiy, i9hS, defeat
was acknovledged.2
This, hovever, did not signalise the Coaaunist ?arty*s ahandoi^
aent of the stru^le for power* As the facade of the Itetienal Libera-
tion front, behind vhieh they had originally aarshalled their forces
fell awy, the Party leaders sought nev catalysts* They found then in
the continued econoaie distress brought about as an aftervath of Vorld
War II, in the inability of the Greek political leaders to establish an
effective govemneiU^, and in the extreae treataent given to the opposi-
tion itjy Hightist groups*
These catalystf, cotq>led vith a decisive defeat at the polls in
19lt6 and a careful assessaent of certain strategic requir^scnts led the
Cooaunist leaders to turn to guerrilla varfare as a neans of obtaining
their end* ^>oae of the strategic requireacnts vhieh they considered
varet
^e agreeaent called for the deaobilisation of all guerrilla
forcet and the s^orender of all weapons* In actual fact, the £U> or-
ganisation reaained potentially inUct and although 10,000 weapons were
surreadered under tht agreeaent, they vere largely uaservicable* The
better ympons vere cached avay for the next round*
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1. 7opograplxy>^Tht aountains of Qr«cet cowr ttor« thtti two-
thirds of ths Mainland and art the haaas of about UO par cant of tha
population. Thara ara no larga tovns in tha aountain araaj, but tha
land si^yperts saall groups in vidaly saparatad villagas. Tha intarior
read net is a primitive one. Thus tha countiy providas alaost optiauft
conditions for vagin^ guarriUa warfara.
2, Outsida Support—Logistical support \ms aval labia to tha
guarrilla foreas from Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria—all Conaunist
countries which had savan hundred ailes of ca«non border with draece.
Thus clothing, rations, aras and araaunition, training cai^, transit
areas, raplacaaant canters, field hospitals, and stqpply depots ware all
easily accessible in safe areas across tha northam borders.
Quarrilla warfare began to burgeon here and there durit^ the
suaner of 19blS, Tha objectives of these operations was to daaenstrata
the <3raai( OovemBtent * 3 inability to naintain lav and order and to ^mphUf
sise the deteriorating eeonealc conditions staining froa the conflict,
tharal^ forcing tha govenwent to sue for a cessation of hostilities on
teras dictated by the gtiarrilla high ceasnad.
Initially, operations ware confined to areas near tha northern
bordari but Hight-ving extremists retaliated in Hind in the south,
giving the disorder a seemingly widespread character, which the Com>
munists, unaided, could net have accomplished. Thus, attention was
diverted from the area in which internal disorder could have been
attributed to foreign intervention, and the Communists wen an early
advantage in their ability to camouflage the war as a domestic affai^»>
the Greek people against tha gevammant in Athens.
/^:j '^iia^3i}QiK jz:-
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During l9hS tnd I^i^T, tht guerrilla bands periodically descended
fre« their aountain hideouts and carried out harassing raids against
unprotected villages in order to collect food and clothing^ recruit
personnel, extort fUnds, sabotage lines of eoaaunieations, and produce a
general disruption of noveaent throughout the country. At this stage of
ttii guerrilla oaa^igni the Cewnmist units ymv lightly equipped and
seldoo concentrated in large formations. They acfiiered largely to the
three principles of successful guerrilla operation-* surprise, sboek
action, and lUbility.
The Orsek govemasnt itself vas unable to institute effective
eounterneatures during this period. v;ne reason for this vas the fact
that tht aroy vas not yet fully organised. It was deficient in training
and, to soue extent, in equlpnent| and the organisation of its coaabat
units, even thos«t of the aountaln type, was not entirely suitable for
eatfbat against the comparatively saall guerrilla bands. 3 Further,
individual Greek politicians deiaanded military security for their hone
districts vithout concern for the total problea. This required the Greek
aray to dissipate its tactical capabilities by pieceaeal deploynent of
aost of its available unit;} to the static defense of towns and villages
throi^jhout the country.
Another factor that contributed to the ineffectiveness of the
arsy was the lack of a strong "will to fight." Prolonged lack of
British ailitary advisors were at first unsuecessfVtl in c^w
vinciag Greek military strategists that small mobile units were required
to suppress the Insurgents. Later in the war, such ** commando^ units
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tiice«39 dcvtt loped • sense of frustration and f^llity. This, in tum^
reeeived noorishaent froa other sources* A lack of eoi^>etent and
agsresf ive eoaaanders, a lack of discipline, and a tiablt of questioning
orders affected the aray*s confidence in its coanand and a spirit of
indecision was fostered, which ailitated agaii^t decisive action*
At the saae tiae, the British encountered a great deal of diffi*
eulty in cstablishine the necev^sary cooperation between the Oreek krmy
and the Oendaraeiypolice forces. The gendaraety in Greece is an amed
police force, which, under the Ministry of Juitice, aaintains order
except within the liaits of tovns having aunieipal police. Efforts to
use the gendanury in araywiiKe operations against the guerrillas ware
unsuccessful. It was not equipped or trained to fiinctton in this
anner. Moreover, while the gendaraery played soldier, its priaary
fwiction suffered. A policeaan*s usefulness depends on his local
knowledge—a faaiiiarity with people and places that enables hia to
<lBteet the unusual. Police cannot be organised into large units and
aoved froa place to place without sacrificing an iaportant princii&le of
police organi£ati<m«
By I9h7, the British were unable to sustain ttu financial support
of the Greek Govemoent any longer, and the United ^.tates, under the
previsions of the Truaan Doctrine, assuaed the responsibility of aain-
taining the Greek econ^i^ and financing and equipping the Greak ar&ed
forces. The initiation of an e}q)ansive Aoerican aid prograa, which was
to total five hundred aiUion dollars by 1952, coupled with ths estab*
lishaent of a U. s. ailitary advisory group a^^ded by General Jaaes Van
aLn-SR
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Fleet, gave the Greek Qovcrnsunt the facilities to begin a prograa to
fight thB guerrillas.
The anBy*3 first aajor caapaign va^ initiated inApril, 19li7.
The plan %fas to attack first in central Greece and then sweep gradually
northward to the border, destroying the guerrillas along the vay«
Thereafter, the border vould be sealed against re- inf i Itration. Tacti-
cally, areas containing guerrilla concentrations were to be isolated and
surrounded, vhereupon the trapped guerrillas iMre to be annihilated.
However, these operations did not go according to plan for several
reasons. The Comtmnist guerrillas were infomed of impending attacks
in given districts in tine to vithdrat^, for the aest part, to soaw
neigt^ring district which had not yet been cleaned up. Even when they
did not withdraw ahead of tiae, most of then usually succeeded in leak-
ing through gaps in the pincers. Moreover, to clear a district of rebel
bands and keep it clear demanded the stationing on the spot of larger
forces than had at first been eitinatcd. The result was that as the
aaln operations were carried northward, the nunber of available gcvem-
eat troops was continually reduced and finally was insufficient to cope
with the situation.
The result of the 19^)7 operations was disheartening. Though the
progress of the bandits had been checked, the Coautunist's threat was by
no aeans ended. In the winter of 19U7-19U6, the bandits reorganised
their forces and set to work to increase th«i. They returned to the
districts from which they had been driven and prepared to oeet the
An^*s new attacks in the coning spring. The leaders of the Coaaunist
bandits also strove to create a ^Free Area" which would be securely in
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thslr hands. They selected as e base the aountainous region of Graaaos*
Vitsi» near the Oreeti-Albanian-Yugoslav border^ and fortified it durins
the winter vlth ailitaxy vorks* basised vlre^ and soae alneflclds.^
In 19UB, the Qreek eoaaand decided that« after a rapid cleaning-
up operation from the south to the north, the Aray^s aaln effort vould
be concentrated against this fortified CosiBunist area, in the hope that
they vould give battle and sustain jerloua losses* Operations b«^m in
the spring, and soon Amy forces were concentrated 01^:9 ite Ht« Ora<aMs.
The fighting continued for aore than tvo iaonths, with considerable
losses <m both sides, and In the end the area was taken* However, the
Conoanist forces escaped throu^ r ibania, and re-entered Greece in the
Vitsi area, farther to the north.
In the autuion of 19Ufi, the Azny attacked this Mountain aass, but
failed in the operation and incurred serious losses* By the end of
l9hB, the whole situation was deteriorating, Coaaimist bandits re-
established theouelves on Ht, OraMMs during the winter. By the spring,
the Connmists had aade good their losses and had extended their activity
to the southcraaost tip of continental Greece, Thsy«ar*sflghtiny had
shoim that the concentration of Amy efforts on uprooting the Coaaunlst
base (Graaaos-Vitsi) close to the border had sli^ly enabled the bandits
to extend their activity in the interior.
However successful the CooiOinist guerrilla operations were to
this tiac, the KK£ realized that its initial objective of destroying the
TTo give this Tree Area*' an appearance of respectability, the
Co—unlets established the "Provisional Deaocratlc GoveroHtnt" in the
QnuMos area on Deceaber 2k, 191^7,
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Greek «cofkoay wmj dooaed to failure so long es U* S. aid to Greece coiv
tiaued. Tlierefore, to ettaln Its final goal of seising power^ its
iffMdiate oi>jeetive beeaiae tte delivery of a decisive blov against tim
ajor obstacle— the Greek National Any. Consequently, in late l9hB,
the guerrilla high eoaaand reorganised its units along conventional
lines in order to oeet the Greek national Aray forces in large-scale
attacks. This decision to transfer their strength to conventional
lines, vith the bulk of their troops again concentrated in the Graaao*
Vltsi area, proved to be the undoii^ of the CooMunlst guerrillas.^
The Greek National Arey eai^aign of i9li9 opened vith another
clearing opention in central Greece, but this, in contrast with the
previous operations, proceeded successfully. Factors which contributad
to the success of this operation verei
1. Aroy and police security forces took steps to destroy or
reader inoperable the c^erriila intelligence net in an area prior to the
start of any operation. This involved the arrest and teaporaty intem-
aent of known Cooaunist sympathisers or suspected inforaers. As a
result, the arsed guerrillas, operating without their "eyes and t^ars,"
could no longer avoid surprise attacks by govemaent units. Guerrilla
leaders and their forces were killed or captured in a nuaber of quickly
executed operations beginning in the south and working north toward the
satellite borders.
Another reason given for the Coaaunist decision to defend this
area by conventional aeans was their need to aaintain a base area froa
which supplies could be received froa Albania or Yugoslavia and then be










2« The duvlopamnt of • VatlofiAl Defense Corps « flmt begun In
i9lxt under erti^ control, b^gtai to poy dividends* 14en fron « certain
lecolity were trained, firmed, and posted to the region froa which they
eaae* The theory being that they could live at hoae, functioning on a
"ainuteoan*' bails* In this vay, as the aray cleared one district after
another froa south to north, the civil coanonftty could provide itt oim
protection, thus allowing for aore profiti^le eaployaent of the amy*
3* The appeintaent of General Alexander Papagos as CossMnder^ in-
Chief of the OreeH land forces galvanised the aray into action* ^ving
refined to accept the post until far-reaching covKitnents as to his
authority had been aade, Piqpagoe %«s in a position to exert fira direo*
tion on the conduct of ailitary operations* tU restored discipline in
the arn^ by the ruthless renoval of unsuitable officers. Hi stressed
aggressive action and ordered the Qreek national Aray into a series of
offensive operations i^ich deprived the guerrilla of the initiative and
afforded hia no respite* The amy was sioqjily aade to do ilhat it waj
capable of doing, and no oore than this was needed to gain the victory*
I. When Yugolavia was expelled froa the Coftinfora in 191^6, its
gaivanvaent cut off Its assistance to the Greeit rebels* With the closing
af the Yugoslav border, the total tnotmt of outside assistance greatly
diainished, throwing the total logistic requireaent for supply on the
internal forces and the underground* Unable to meet the continueua
s«^ly problem, the Coaaunist war efforts wre greatly slowed down*
V'ith the success of the operation in the south and central part
of Greece, the Greek National Amy was, by the end of June, 19li9, able
to eoncentmte its troop;^ in the Grasnos-Vitsi area* As mentioned
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prtfvlously, th« giMrrilla high co«DUKid had nadc tht stratafii^ «rror of
d«cidlng to hold and d«f«ad thtsa araag alwfig eonvantlonal lines. Fol*
lovifig a dlver^iioii in the GmHws araa, the govamaant troops lauochad
an attack in tim Vitsi area on August 10* within thrac days^ the posi-
tion had been overrun. In the araaaaa operation launched on August Zh,
the tvo hundred square ailes oX the area wre oeaqsied in five days. The
result MIS the destruction or dlabandaient of the bulk of the guerrilla
forces in Greece. Those guerrilla reanants which escaped into Albania
could no loii^r be reconstituted as an effeetiver fighting force. By the
end of I9ii9, a fev saially starving, and desperate ^lerrilla bands ymf
left in the oountainSf their entire effort directed toward survival.
They were ai literiiy incapable of any significant activity.
In suMtttion, tht failure of the GreeH Cooninist Party to bring
Orecce into the Caewunist orbit can be attributed to a nuaber of factors.
Hot the least of «rtkich was their oryaninational and operational blunders}
such aSf reorganisation into conventional units which reduced nobility
and tended to dictate conventional warfare. Other important factors,
ganamlly beyond the control of the KKL wares Yugoslav denial of supply
routes into northern Greece | British and Aaerican aid prograas which
sustained U» govemoent and iapn^Md the capabilities of the Greek
Any, while at the »mm tine staving off the collapse of the national
^In the Vitsi e«^)aign, of a guerrilla garrison of 7,000, i^proxi-
ately 5»000 withdrew into Albania. In the Granaes eaapaign, approxl-
aaUly li,XO querrillas withdrew into Albania. Although still
nuaerically fairly strong, tht guerrillas lacked both the internal
support of the populaticm and the availability of external 3U|q»ort with
which to continue the fighting.
8e
-Jt'V'?. i\ix atA.'it»j* •'.'•5 *^is ^&^jtr >*i»r .vs ;.'".; 'J/: US
'A oo noli
??59^ y?9»? -"'»-;» ."'<f5 aifi
TAOPW J'-«J»iei.-k ttii j'S'a .>.i.'-^: -V-, '.'-1 i ij^*.'»> >;;•»,; ii'W,. .« e''t^\-- il. *jrfW
I
.>>'f^;.' f ' ?« .'f -?-^ ? 't »>j- '. r^f •" ^ . I H'-t ; >.-4'-i -
-TJsOUi'ittW dill* "




•oonoayi »nd the appointacnt of Cl«n«r«l Papagos and other capabU
officers to r«piac« tht old and incoapetcnt amy leadars,
Philippines Uppendlx B)
The CoflMunitt Party of the Philippines » the CPP^ vas organiaed on
7 Xaivwiber 1?30« As a political party» it w^ insignificant and never
did aesune any aajor legitiaate political stature* On 26 October 1932,
tha SMpreae Court of the Philippines declared the party to be illegal
under ths Philippintt Cenatitution and thi party was forced to so under-
ground. Its activities » hovevar, continued through various legal
peasant and labor organ!sations .7
During Uorld ^ar II, thousands of rilipinos« iapelled by a eosHien
diasire to resist the J9pmi»s9, joined the araed faction of ths Coswunist
Party vith little knovledge of the aims of the organisation* This
strong guerrilla orgsjiization^ under the leadership of a dedicated
Ceaauniatj Luis Taruc, becane widely knoMi as the Huhbalahap^ a vord
coined free the syllables of the Tagalog title "Hukbo Vu Bayan Laban Sa
M^wn," or People* s Anti-Japanese Amy* The Hukbalah^;) > or Huks for
short, var-tiae record wis one of maerous engagenents against both the
Japanese and other Filipino guerrliia units*
Although the Kukialahap was officially disbanded in l9hS, the
leaders were able to aaintain contact vith tuost of the aeaib^rs through a
veterans league* hai^ of the veterans haa iupt their aras, and were
7&xaaples of these organisations veret (1) the Printer? Union of
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quickly able to t9rm. guard units in muiy barrios. ^hcii tlw CoommiJt
leaders docided to launch ^p«n warfare in 191(6, it vas that not veiy
difficult for the« to reconstituU the HuKs aji a f ightiiMs orsaaiiatioa
and to rebuild the underflreund support network.
It would be Kisleading to picture the ttuk uprising in the
Philippines Just afUr World War U as aereiy the \»r% of a discontented
minority. The Huks, at first, were a popular luws aoventent, until their
CoMunist leaders showed thtir hand too cleariy. They found their
strength in a deep-seaUd peasant discontent arising froa genuine grici^-
aases. These grievances vere predominantlyof econoaic, rather than
political, origin* The crux of the problea vma landlordis«« A high
percentage of the farms in the Philippines wre owned by rich landlords
aad ^»erated by tenants. >or exaspU^ in the Candaba Smnp area »f
Uusoa, seae 2 per cent of the people owned 9£ ptr cent of the land, and
70 per cent of the fansers were teruuit^. In four of the provinces of
Luzon, at least 60 per cent oi tne ittras were wortutd by tenants, and
those provinces beeaae the real stronghold of the Huks.^
As elsewhere in Asia, absentee landlorlism brought its coiKoai*
taat cursei moneylanding. With average incomes ij. xrom >l60-l60,
temnt families were faced with avermge yearly living costs of $313*
Inevitably, they turned to the moneylender. Onoe caught in the clutches
of the usurer, the tenant farmer never emergedj with interest rates of
^A barrio is a village or s\d>division of a town and usually
includes large areas of adjoining arable land.
9l?!Hia« 0. Douglas, Worth from jlalaya (Garden City, Sew Yorkt
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IGO and Vf9n 200 p«r 6«ni • y«ar« rtptyncnt of principal ws out of ths
question. Yet these vere oniy a Tev of the tenant farmer's troOtle^it
The absence of all-weather raada puts aansf f«m«rs out of
contact viU-i the Aarkats at critical periods. The absence of
aciaquate muH econwic storage space for fam produce force i the
faraer to sell in a lov and to buy in a hl(^ aarket. The absence
of cooperative aarlceting and buying facilities put$ the faraer
at the aercy of the Chinese atiddleaan. Thtre are very fev eo»
operative rice aills. The Chinese e^iUlist or the landlord
takes his toll there, too* And there is no such thins in the
Philippines ae a floor under farw prices »i^
Kor vas the a<teinistratiQn setting an exaaple likely to encourage
a respect for lav and order* Inflation, corruption, inefficiency, and
profiteering froa Asutrican aid agi^ravacea proo^ei^ which the Philippine
GovvmaenL faced as a result of World «t&r tX* >nall vonder that the
CuiiMMiiliit doctrine of agarisn and govemsient refora found isany reac^
recruits aaong the one and one-r«aif i&iiiion faraing families living
be lov the subsistence level.
In 19ii6, the Kuks openly declared thsir Coauatmlst orientation^
took the field as an anti-govemnent ^iuiioax^ir^ap rarty, and actually
elected seven oen to the legislature. The legislature refused to seat
then and Luis Taruc, \Aio vas one of those elected, v^nt bsck to the
countryside and raised the standard of armed revolt agaiii^t t,n& govern*
ent, A series of grudge and revenge kill itigs followed.
i^uuiel RotxAs, first president of the nevly- created Philippine
Republic, tried to peieuade the Huks to disband their military units,
surrender their eras, and return to peacefltl living. The Huk^ defied
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Troops froA the national Pollc* Fore«» the Phlltpplnt ComUitialMry, wtrt
deployed in th« ar<«i3 of aaxiwia distuiiMine«* But ih»t vas already a
fastaring situation was aade vorsa by counitting uatrainad ailitary
polica tmits to an extreaaly delieata aission. Uith littla fira gyid-
anc« other than ^U3C torcm,^ aooa o£ th« police returned abuae for
abuie, jTraquentiy treating their ovn countiyaen aj people of an occu*
pied territory. The "sailed fist" often uas indiscriainate ly a;^lied to
civilian friend as iiell as aiiitary foe, Soon oaoy Filipino fantere and
civilians feared the Constabulary troops as auch or aore than the liaks*
Thid destroyed the respect and confidence of the people « not oniy in
their ar««d forces > but in the central govertawnt.
At this point* a reaction against brute force occiurred* and the
gwianwant, now under President Quirlno, ui^cided to atteapt a nev policy
of aanesty. After aonths of fruitless negotiations, this aaaesty policy
collapsed, and in 19Ud« the gevemnent again resuaed the "police
action.**^^ This respite had given the Huks an o|^>ortunity to reorgaalsey
rehabilitate, replenish, and stockpile critical itcAS such as anaunition
and iiadicine*
In 1919, the Hok naoe was officially changed to ^'liiitbo Uq
mpagpalaya ;;a Bayan," the iVB or People* <i Liberation Aro^. The aove-
ant, however, continued to be known li^ its former naaa* Taking advani*
tage of the lov aorale of the pe^le, they launched a series of dctexw
Mined attacks aj^inet the Qovemnent, raiding weakly*dafended towns,
kidnapping, and placing organisers in captured territexy for aspionage
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•nd r«crulta«nt •ctivitUs* Altluntgh tht Hakt vgr« not strong «noagh in
force to uadcrtalM tht ovorthrov of tht <3ov«nmit directiy^ it jms^
Misod Urn e«p«bilitt«3 to coaaandi any fiivta situation by its tiit^aadk
run tactics*
By 1950, the Huke nuttberod at Uast tuanty thousand and roaaed at
vill over aueh of Luaon.^^ They controlled aajor portions of the coun»
tfy side, soveming towns and barrios, collecting taxes, tributes, and
ransQss, occupying the fams, and running aiXitary and civilian schools.
In areas where the people did not syi^athize with the Coaannist novo*
ent, the CPP used intiaidation and reprisals to keep thea froa cooper-
ating with the govemaent. iBy April of that year, the Huks hiMl spr«ed
ffwi central Luson to other provinces providing a serious threat to the
very existence of the state.
At this point, Raaon Hagsaysay began to pXay his ever-increasi^
role in the Huk eaapaign. After his appolntaent as secretary of
Vational Defense on 1 >epteaber 1950, ilagsaysay began to reassess the
Coamnist preblen and deteraine td^ and where the govemaent had fkiXed
in the past. Although technically his field of rasponsibility was
restricted to the ailitary, Kageaysay quickly realised that in or^r to
coabat the Coaaunist threat there had to be, in addition to ailitary
action, a aaiiQr- faceted political^ psychological, technological, and
amnesty terns and surrendered thiaselves and their weapons.
^%stiaated figures on the **ar«ed*' HuH strength range froa l5,00O>
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socto^ceonoaic opermtion in th« PhillppiAss* itessiQnsay li^liSKnWd «
sMtplag polley*
fit first elt«fi»d out and rtorsanliMd tb* constalouiaiy «id amy
from top t9 bottott. Tifitfit3^>»ix stU'-sufl'leUBt b»tt«llon e««bBt tciAS
(BCT*t) with int«lti6«tie«, psyeholegieal i«irfftr« and Mstlieal fltetiens
were fora«<3 wad <ach aasigncd to a particular saction. Thtsa BCT*S;»
together vith Air forea and Mavy units foratd task fareas to conduct
coablned operations vhen neeessairy. Kewevary the «<i^)haii3 for eariyins
the war to the guerrilla was placed on the ground forces tdio covered the
sectors vith fast aobile forces suj^^rted lay strong reserves*
A detemined effort to rid the am^ of inefficient and uiureliable
officers led to the disnissai of personnel of ail ranks « tr^t^ the Chief
of Staff of the Philippine Aray idao was an influential personal friend
of the Presidei^f to local battalion conaanders uho were slow in cartying
out counter-operations against guerrilla tmnds, Hagsaysey stua^dl the
country on unheralded trips » seeing for hioself. Us attendad to the
grievances of the soldiers and constables^ and preaoted officers of his
OMR choice who had been particularly effective aj^i^t tht entiQr.
Rations were increased and soldiers Mere told to use then utd
nothing else* Any charges of looting were prosily investigated ai^ the
offenders sunnarily punished. The amad forces were rehired to build
such public works as bridgesj barrio roads* i«Us« and school houses
when th^y vera not fitting. The villagers had to be convinced that
their real friends were the amad forces of thtir gevemaent and not the
terrorists n^ had -pr^y^d on then*
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Authorities dcvtl^Md • ertsh j^rogrM to goin the intolllgoneo
noeossory to insuro allitofy success • Ijitonse Intorrogottoii of the
AMily ond friends of known Huks urns undertaken to urge thtae people to
encourmge tht sfuerrilles to obondon the Covaunist eause, or to get then
to net as undercover agents and Infiltrate HuH units and their civilian
front organisations. The effectiveness of this effort uas highlighted
bgr the capture of the Cooaimist Politburo In Manila. This operation
began when J^t^ti^iqr learned froa an inforaer the identity of an under*-
ground courier in Manila. Government agents folloued the courier and
when a raid uas finally aade, twelve aenbers of the Politburo were
captured along with other high-ranking officials with oany Party records.
These records Included a coapletc roster of all aenbers of the Party In
the Philippines^ Party syiq;>athissers and active Huk supporters* Addi-
tional docuaents described the ttsnageoent of the organization. The
Inforaation gained froa the raid was significant in the subaeqoent
breaking of the aoveaent.
To eoapleaent the purely allltary aspect of the caajwlgn, tht
araed forces Initiated a pelley of "attraction and fellowship.*^ This
policy eirisraced several levels of action against individual Holu,
depending on the degree of the individual*! coaplleity. Against those
trtio knew nothing but the language of naked force » a systea of rewards
was instituted for Inforaation leading to their i^sprehension or death.
As the rntvx of rewardjs attracted aore cooperation froa civilians
,
li^luding Huks theaselveSf suspicion and dissension cropped up aaoag the
Httit r«ik and file. Top Huk leaders en whose heads high rewards were
plaeed, hardly dared aove outsl£fai ^mit ewMtft^ lll4i«iJk»«
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For tht KuHs and ComunlBt'i iriw wKtorsiood «id mon^ptMd tXm Unu
of tht attrmction driv*^ thu •ra«d forces proviited for thtir r«tum to
pcae<ful society. Several Eeonoftic Dewlopaeat Corps (cDOOR) settle-
Bents Mtre cleared on the fertile underpopulated island of Mindanao*
The e3»»^KlK vas giwn six to ten hectares of land (roughly fifteen to
ti«nty-five acres) initially cleared by the areied forces^ a aodest hat
ifhieh he helped to build, subsistence allo««noes i»d crop loons to tide
hia throu^ the fir^t harvest, a work anioal^ and farm i^ieaefits.
Magsaysay once coonented, '^hey are fighting the Ctovenwent because they
\mnt a house and land of their oun* All rigt^, they can stop fishtlng,
because I will give it to thea«»U
^y 195l» the Huks were on the run, and the peasants, if net
exactly pro»sovenis«nt, were no longer hostile to the central authority*
Heifever, a further effort vas needed and Hasseysay furnished it* He
nade provisions for the peasant to have the rigii^ of legal council at
govemaent txptm^ if he so desired* As a guar^Atee of orcj^r and
hoMsty in elections, the axned forces Mere ^epleyed at the polls to
safeguard the ballot. Tvo clean and orderly national elections and a
rigorous drive against graft and corruption gradually restored the
people's confidence in tht ability of the govemaent to counteract the
physical aenaee poised by CoMatnist insurrection and to offer a positive,
legitiaate social and economic program to offset Conaunism's grandiose
promises*
13Kenneth M* Htaaer, "Huh.s in the Philippines," .Ntodern Querrilla
^^rfare , Franklin H* Osanloi, editor (Hew Torki The Free Press"©?
Qlencoe, 1962), p. l82.
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These steps wtre to ttum the tide of popular support e%«y froei
the CoMRanists end st^pporters flocteed to the side of itegsaysay. He so
oeptured the eonfidenee of the people that in 1953 he was elected Presi-
dent of the Republic of the Philippines. In this eapaeity> he vas able
to extend the anti*Coanunist principles in which he believed to the entire
internal Philippine govemaent. Perhaps to the extreae of ander«inino
the aorale of soae of his o^inet aeabers and lesser govemaent of^^
eials» he relieved officials ruthless ly» no aatter vhat their social
position or rank. He prosecuted corruption i^ierever he found it. He
stole the thunder froa the Cenamist's slogans* like ^land for the land-
less** and "equality for all.**
CauBtering each of the CPP rallying cries, he continued the fax>^
reaching econoaic and sociological prograas of the Defense Departaent.
A nev ainiaua wage lav prescribing ainiaua wages for various categories
of skilled, seai*skilled, and unskilled labor nullified the effect of
Cuaaunist propaganda on the labor front. A CooHtission was appointed to
ax^itrate the tenant- landlord problem. Aids to snail businesses and
famers were established. The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Financing Association aade rural credit available at a legal rate and
allowed the peasant to free hiaself froa the <^bt slavery of the aoney*
ImnSmn^ The Pamer's Co-operative Marketing Association allowed the
tenant faraers to eliainate the aiddleaan and sell their crops at a
profitable rather than a prohibitive price.
Vtth the population firaly supporting Itegsaysa^ and the aray
operating effIcientay, support for and the strength of the Coaaomists
dwindled rapidly. Where originally battalion and coa^mc^siee bivouacs
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of one hufidr«d or aer« Hmka eould b« found, thiy nov split into itinsr*
mot groups of froa tv^nty to thirty and avoided eoaflict* The «iarr«Qd»r
of Luis Toruc, th« Coaaunist gontrol of the rebellion. In 19514, Indl*
catcd thi Mskenlng pee ition of the CowMnlete. By 1957 1 the guerrlllasi
had been reduced to bands of t2iree to five nen vainly trying to exist.
This is the situation today with less than a few himdred amed die-hard
Huks still roaaing tht. jungles and swaaps of the Philippines.
In sttoaation, neglect and aisrule created the conditions in the
Phili^ines vhleh alloned the coaaunlst insurrection to thrive on the
geAline grievances of the population. Fare repression vas Initially
ineffectual, as was a policy of aanesty which was backed on^ by adain*
Istratlve chaos. In the end, strei^ leadership under Magsoysay, coupled
with efficient operations and visible reforaif , did the trick. Although
the Govenwent of the Philippines today faces aany difficult and trying
probleas in Its path toward dcvalopaent, Coaaunlst takeover of the
govemnent is not one of then.
Jtalaya (Appendix C)
When the Coaaunlst organisers aoved into British Halaya In the
1920* s, they got a cool reception fron the flalays.^^ These pe(^le« mat
of thea devout Mosleas, were satisfied with their sli^le pattern of life
and had little stoaaeh for a dogaa which required dedication to a hard
fUtd deaanding existence. The Indian Taalls, i^ eoaprlsed somewhat lets
l^he tern "Malayan" will be used to designate all peoples living
on the Malayan Peninsula, Including the Chinese and other minorities.
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than 10 p«r c«at of ths population and v»r« the sacood of Utraa aain
attailc grot^s In Malaya, uarc also hard to stir with Karxitt doctrim»
sinea thay alraa<3y banafitad froa valfarc profiraas arrangad Jointly by
tha Indian and )falay«n govamaant. But thara mu ona larga and influ->
antial athnie ainority In Malaya vhich felt sufficiantly "rootless* to
ba attracted by Coamni^t praaohnants. This was tha "overseas Chinese"
eeawuttity, which constituted approyiaately two-fifths of tha total
population in 1930, the year in which the Malayan CoaMuaist Party, tha
X^?, was fouikdad*
Althflogh dcelarad illegal in its early years, the HCP concentrated
an penetrating and controlling the la][H>r field and on spreading Gosmt-
Aist propaganda aaoBO y^th. The econoAic dapresslcn of this period,
with its si4»aquant iap&ct on the mtiss of Chinese laborers in the
Malayan tin and n^>bar industries, initially stimulated its growth.
However, when the Party engineered wide- spread strikes in 1936 and 1937
which lad to aany arrests, a aarturd decline in tm JCP's popularity
aaong labor \m% noted.
The Party's next approach was Uie foraation, in late 1937 and
1936 » of an anti-Japanese popular front. This device restored party
influence aaong the working class, and by the beginning of Korld '«'ar II
tlMT MCP ooaaanded a coaparativa ly strong following anang the Chinese. ^^
After the events In Europe in June 19ll, the MCF approaehad tha
British with a proposal to cooperate in the war effort. Initially, the
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British rtfustd th« tiint, but the JapttM?* iiiv»sieQ 9f ^laym left thtm
llttlt choieCf because ths HCF, thrott(j^ Its cUmdestiai tad illesal net*
«errk« l>ce««e tht only representetive of authority in llelaya ethtr th«a
ihi Ji^^nese* Eesl stance efforts iwre directed through two ersenisa-'
tions Hnoun es tht jtelayaa Pei^les Anti^Jepaaese An^, the MBAJA^ and
tht Malayan Peoples Ant{-Japanese UnioB> tht P^JiJ, both of vhieh were
oovertly controlled )sy the Central Cemiittee of the MCP* Tht Aray Mk^
tht ailitaxy era of the resistance aoveaent a^ the Union served as the
underground nttv«rk responsible for ii^elligeneef recruits » and si^iplies*
The British stqiplied the guerrillas vith food, clothing and
weapons In preparation for a planntd Joint operation against the Japa*
nese. However^ the surrender of Japan ohai^d all tm ^iMm and instead
of invasion thtrt was a peaceful rtoocupation. Tht British atteiq>ted to
disband the guerrillas after the war» but the ;tept Its units
fairly intact by falsifying the aeaibership lists sulxiitted to the
British* foming the *%)ld Caarades Asiiociation?/ and hiding large
quantities of arts»
During the years between I9k$ and 19U8» the CoMMunlsts chose to
follow a so-called •^moderate i^licyy'* giving tht party a acre definite
political line. Thty ccoMienced a cav^ign of political agitation and
asiie a second concentrated effort to tabs over the field of labor orgaai*
tation. Initially tht effort aet with great success until a was
reached where 21ii out of a total of 27? registered unimis In lialaya,!^
^^A, Shurcllff, "The Growth of Democrstlc Trad*->Unians In the
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ineludioQ the lc«y tin^ nibb«r, and longshortiun*s unions^ ver« Conuiiist
domiAaUd. Howv«r, by tht spring of 19kB, ths tid« In tht l«bor imttlM
htgan to turn towsrd ths British. U*>« of fntln!(:tetlon a* a va&nnn of
Midbcr control, lack of any conortte plan or program for a unicn jiica
<:entrol had been atlsad, effective and syi^thttlc action on the part of
the British Labor Qov@^mnent to Institute s llbersl and ommjar tiii>or
prograa, and legislation to reduce end police tne range of Red labor
activity all coabined to reduce Coaaunist influence in the field.
Lack of success In the labor field, coutjled vft.h 9. r^inr-
the eeonoay of Malaya because of a deaand for ruJi^ber in aft
War II, convinced the Coimwnlst leaders that viol
order for their revolution to have a chanca of *«««-?-. Tr^ itarci. ,,
.
19I16, under the leadership of Chen Feng, the ;>ecreiary-(i8F»ra'
¥CP, the call vent out for armed revolution.
Let us pause, at this point, and exa&lne the Conaunist objective
in regard to Xalaya and the aeans by which they intended to accoi^^llsh
that dojeotlve. Their ultloate ala was to llberau the Malayan people
froa the British "li^rlallsts" and to fora a Coaaunlst State. To accom-
plish this, the Coaaunlsts, following the teachings of Mao, divided
their plan Into three phases. In the first phase, they plannt
veaken tht British position by paralysing the rubber and tin i««u
the chief pillars of the Malayan econon^, while at the same tlae pre-
serving and expandli^ their owi forces. In the second phase, the IC?
planned to drive the British froa the hinterland and establish liberated




i-G- j\jsci wv-? li-y fivi .;'*»
Mie¥ i!A<"^e all tm» ^.
« 'tifj o i«wi V »«• a
a2
$2
fim§% nould involvt tYm crestioe of a '*lU>«rmtlon an^" which vw: H
the llbcimUd areas and conquer Malaya.
ApproxloaUZy half of the "old tlsers" fro«
the party suaaoas and Joined the guerrilla forces, whica oecaa*
tht Malayan Races Liberation An^, the miA, Mev recruits brought the
ar^ up to a strength of froa five to six thousand active reauJsr . ?^«
Covainlsts eisbarked t^on a variety of offensive activities.
earried out payroll «A>berie3 to Obtain operating funds for th<;
Other ganes^ In order to Intimidate the population with a .ahcii „^,
slashtd or burned Uiouaands of n^bber trc€ jsed installations at
the tin mines. Haiiroad tracks were ripped up and telephone llne^
Vell-to-do Europeans, Chinese, and Malays ware kldn^..^.
murdered for reasons of sheer terrorisa. On ^ "
GovensMnt proclalaed a state of esergeney, and om o "
wars of ths Cold ^ar had begun.
Initially, the burden of the eaergency fell upo
the Federation Police. This was a alxed force of s
of all ranks^coiqirlsins Malays, Chinese, and a fev Indians—under
British officers. Thty were not organised for a Jungle w
either personnel or equipment, and In the early di^ys of the
Communist terrorists, or CT*$ as they became universally tmown,
eoaslderable success.
The terrorists* task was made much easier by the pz^sence oi
Mln Yuen, lAlch was the civilian ara of the MCP. Its main duties
Included furnishing the guerrillas with material supplies, function
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vith the iiMsts. Hot • f«v of then ltd a doublt life, cftrrying out
alssion-9 for the guerrillas by night and blending into the civil occu-
pational pattern by day. Initially, the large aajorlty of its iieabers
vere Chinese squatters who lived at the edge of the jungle. I^W of
these people had settled in these areas during the Mir, hoping to escape
tron the Japanese occupation officials, who vere knovn to be ««ch
harsiier on Chinese than Malays. Although the sajority of these $qi»tters
vere synpathetic to the Coaounist cause, it aade little difference to
the terrorists if sooe did not choose to assist the*. After a fev wil-
choien oturder victlas ted been dispatched, a eoiunmity was usually
tuffie lent ly cowed to agree to ar^ demand which the terrorists atlght
aake. It was physically impossible for the British to provide initially
ary degree of protection to these scattered s^juatter commimities.
To counter the Coaminist strategy, the government made several
ooves. Under the Emergency Regulations, the rl!c« were given wide
sweeping authority which iaj fxirther Increasea as the revolution pro-
gressed. All ar^^ units in Malaya were assigned to assist the civil
authorities. The Cosaunist Party was again outlawed and Known ComiBunlst
Front organisations were di:>banded. Arms were distributed to the rubber
estates and tin mines, and a special constabulary was formed and assigned
to them for their protection.
These tactics, which were primarily of a defensive natur
successful in preventing the Communists from disrupting the JIalayan
economy and accomplishing the first phase of their cas^ign. But this
did not signal the end of the revolution, the Coaiaunists turned from
guerrilla warfare to terrorism and the number of incidents continued.
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Up through I9h9t tht aovsma^nt \m$ sblt to hold its ovn agilrut
tht CT*s, but not « gr««t d«al of positive h««dMiy mis saado. It v»»
true that CooMunltts vtre killodf but recruits \itre equal to lossos, the
Kin Yuen was still relatively intact, and the nuMber and place of inci-
dents remained at the discretion of the Coanunists,
Realising that coordination between the adainietration, the
police, and the ar«y night ii^»rove their ant i» guerrilla capacity, the
British goveiiwent decided to appoint a Director of Operatioai to take
fUll charge of carrying out the fight against the Comtunists. Lieutenant*
C3eneral Harold Briggs was appointed as the Director of Operationg in
March of 1950. His plan of action was to protect the populated area<<|
cut the eneay linei of coawunication, and force hifi out to battle* This
action beeane knoun as the Briggs Plan*
The crux of the Briggs Plan was the re^ettleaent of the Chinese
s<|aatters. Cosuttencing in June, 1950, sore than a half million Chinese
ware resettled in new villages reaovcd fron the Jungle and easier to
guard. Altogether, nore than six hundred new cooaunities were construc-
ted at a considerable cost to the govemss«nt. Those villages ^ieh weart
locatea in rural areas closest to the Jungle were enclosed by barbed
wire and their perioieters were lighted at night. All of then were Kept
under constant police surveillance.
The resettleaent prograa had the twofold effect of depriving lim
CoBttunists of a aain source of supply and giving the squatters protec-
tion froa the intiaidation, extortion, and surder they feared. Further-
more, it raised the aorale of the "new villagers" by giving thea better
living conditions, showing thia the tangible evidence of what the
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gevsmaent had to offer was also instruattntal In oiling ths vh««l9 of
the intelligence aachlae. Contented and protected eitiasens are far aore
likely to cooperate with the forces of lav and order than are discon-
tented and unprotected ones.
The Coaaunists ware quiclt to really the io^rtance of the project
because they used every aeans available to disrupt, harass^ or stall the
ttoveaent. The project \m$ completed, but It took several yeari to
finish and the results were slow to be seen. However, the project was
conceived of as a long-range prosraA which would only produce results
over an extended period and events proved this ctmcept correct.
In conjunction with the resettleoent prograa, "operation starva>
tion" was initiated in June of 1951* This plan called for strict con-
trol and restricted sales of various ccoBaodities. This rationing
program was stringently enforced, even to the extent of insisting that
all cans should t» pierced by their purchaser before leaving ilm shop,
to prevent thea being put into food dua^s for the terrorists. Further,
the British prevented the Coamnlst froa receiving external aid by
cwitrolling the sea approaches to ilalaya, aiuj any chance of securing
help froa the Chinese Ceouttmist^ through Thailand faded when that country
Joined fs£ATO« As their food caches were reduced, the CT*s got more and
aore desperate) thsy took risks and by so doing ejqiosea theaselves to
Siecurity Force retaliation.
Gradually, civilian aorale i;^roved. Moraal railway and road
(toaaonl cations were restored and private property, especially the rubber
plantation and tin aines, becaae less susceptible to destructive raids.
Tht popularity of the Coaiumists declined as greater blaae was laid to
1e ^.I:;ssV s:i;* z:^*' it
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the party for prolonging tim troubltsoa* situation. On October 1, i9SX,
• party direct iv« called for the andine of indisdriftlnaU terrorif«.
CoflBounists Mire urged to ei^>hafli«e the Indoetrinatlon of the aatsea^
propa^«)da against conserlptton^ the obatmetioe of sovemaent policies
isy no»>violent oeans, and penetration of trade unions* Violence^ how-
ever, %»$ not ruled out completely, A list of targets was gl^m against
vhich it nould always be open season. On this list %#trc stiOjbom reao«
tiimaries, traitors, British ^nrlsoners, British aanagers of nines and
rubber estates, resettieaent officers in ths new villages, and police
officers. Because of an inflexible cennmieation systea founded on
Hamn couriers, it took this directive a year to filter down through the
entire CwaBunist organisation, and there i«s no sharp drop in terrorist
acts, aerely a gradual decline.
The British began to step up their prmsBm-^ against the gmi>
riilas. The lapetus for such a move was provided by the a^ppolntnent in
January of 1952 of General Oerald Teiq>ler as High Coaaiss loner of the
Federation of Malaya. Teapler aade aaxlaua use of the existii^ nachinttiy
and iaproved upon It. He cleared aside the ^stae las iiihich were reducing
the effectiveness of the Briggs plan and the resettlMant progrtM vas
completed. The police were reorganised and retrained. Hoae Ouard
forces, consisting of local citizens providing their own protection,
ware strengthened. Testier galvanised civilian norale by ptT»&mi
appearances, pushing for 3elf»govemei«nt, and for the increase of a aore
eoaaon cltlsenshlp for all in the federation. As with th« esctsiples of
Papagos In Qreeee and Hagsaysay in the Philippines, the strong leadership
of Testier proved to be a prlae asset In the war against the guerrillas.
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SOQn thi fiiiitary pietur* l>«sin to isprovt. As the r«3cttl«E««nt plan
bccasM •ff«ctiv« and thorn* Gumrd forces took over the protective duties
of the villaees, the Anny vas able to release «ore aad aere forces to
offensive operations. Head-on penetration and attack by battalion-
sieed units based outside the Jungle was abandoned. Instead^ the British
sent units in platoon and squad strength into the Jtin{}ie, vtutre they kept
the CT*s under constant pressure and made it harder for then to launch
raids.
The offensive ci^Mibility of the British forces vas enhanced 2^
the inability of the flalayan CtMuamists to create an aray which could in
asgr way constitute a threat to the British in battle, f Ince they were
not confronted with such a ailitary threat « the British were able to
eoncentrate on the best strategy for dealif^) with £^rrtllas| naoely,
aeiuAtins their own iuerriila operation. The "ecurity Forces, aided by
the Air Force providing loijistic support vita lixeo-ving aircralt. and
rapid transit with helicopters, were able to oove isen through the
Jungle for greater distances at greater speed than tht Coaaunlsts, and
to hold aabush positions for longer periods of tiae. Thus, by using
their own tactics against theap>»naaely^ aobllity and surprise—the
Security Forces were effectively able to handle the atlitary potential
•f the CoMRanlsts.
Along with the increase in ailitary operations uas a step tip in
the flex', of psychological warfare. Large rewards were offered for the
capture of leading terrorists. Loudspeakers carried in aircraft and the
dropping of thousands of leaflets were used to per^ruade the guerrillas
to ooAc out of the Jungle and surrender. laounlty vas praaised to those
n»«j.v i«ii»ft»ii^?» .i "- ^r ii.i -i .i'l--ii* i-hifitlr »}i noar
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niio surreiui«r<ci unl«s9 they had be«n guilty of notorious crioKis. Thi<i
awMsty vms strictiy otj«rv«d and^ by 1!;^56« aiaout 1,700 Cowaitfiists had
surr«nder«d*^7
Quit« ort«n the sun who 3urr«nd«red gav* valuable inforiiation
about thtir coaradts and cv«n yuid«d troops to thair eaaj^s,^" In 1^53*
soaa l80 of thoa fomtd a special voluntaar fore« and fouflht aoalnat the
S^rrillas. "^evaral rehabilitation centers vex«; w^^^^d vhar« Cosaamlstit
vara r«»-«ducat^d and riturmd to civilian lif«. Lass than I par cent of
thoje released rejoined the Ceaauaist Party. ^^
The previously aueottoned inability of the Cowuunists to create a
ain ar«y also indirectly aided the British in their battle for the
•*,
• • hearts and aind of the people."^ The fact that the British wra
able to prevent any concentration of the Coaounists i exoeadinaly
the type and msaber of targets vhich they could attacK* In particular,
they could do little aore than striite against civilians or saalX groups
Qx security Forces. But this bacaae terror lia and not guerrilla varfare.
Terrorise can be effective only as long as tlie sovamaant is unable to
^^ucian ¥, ?ye. Guerrilla Coaaunisak Jin fiaXaya (Princeton!
Princeton University Press, 19^6), p. 109.
^^he previously sentioned Pye book, see note nuaber seventeen,
provides a valuable insight into the guerrilla aind. The auttor inter-
viewed a considerable fMiaber of captured guerrillas, and his book is a
suaaatlon of their ideas and thoughts.
'^Lennox A. Mills, Halayat A Political and cconoajc Appraisal
(Minneapolist University of Minnesota Press, l558), p. 65.
2^t. Col. Rowland S. I. Mans, "Victory In Malaya,** The CKterriUa—
And How To Fight !iia. Lt. Col. T. H. Oreene (ed.> (liev Yorks Frederick
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protect the populstien, end it becoMs sn effectIw propesandm weepwi in
the hsnde of the goveraoent vhen such protection is provided* By giving
•illtary security through the protected viUoges, end es ve shell dis-
cuss next* soae voice in the govemnent, the British were effectively
ble to lebel the Conkmists ms terrorists, rother then as "netionnl
liberators,** vhieh is how the CoaoMSists would have liked to aj^ar to
the population*
As the Ailitary picture ii^roved, so did the political one* At
the tiae the Eaergenc)' Isegan, there were fev ii^rtant opinion leaders
in Halaya vlio had the stature ::« coaaand widespread siqjport* This
prohlea was especially critical in regard to the Chlmse eoaaunlty,
which traditionally sought security by joining informal associations*
To the Chinese, security could be found only in personal and highly
particular relationships, and not in iapersonal and foraal relations
with govanmental agencies* The British recognised this problea and
called upon the aore respected aen in the Chinese cosaamlty to create an
organisation which would deaonstrate that the Coanuaists were not the
leaders of the Chinese* The result was the founding of the Malayan
Chinese Association*
At the saae tiae ths governaent gave indirect su^ort to other
political associations, in particular the Independence of Malaya Party
and later the Labour Party* The British also continued the policy of
supporting the developaent of a free trade unitm anveaent*
In order for these enerj^ing political groups to serve the
purpose of both countering Coaaunisa and contributing to the deaoeratie
^7 »>r i?» v^iq td^ i^ttoufi x:rit«j0»t xT'<^Hla
••''
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d«v«lopa«nt of Mslaya, it was accessary to aalco it ii^ortant for th«a to
gain popular s^^>ort. Out of this, oaao th« docision to introduce
oaniRsful popular elections and eventual deaeoratie self-govemnent, a
developaent which further weakened the eiata of the Malayan Conamists
thit they were a "nationalistic" aevement.
In July, 19559 general elections were held and the Alliance
Party> vhlch was foraed b^' Malay* Chinese, and Indian parties, won
fifty-one out of the fifty-two elected seats in the Legislative Council
and took over internal control of the sovemaent. The British High
Coaaissimier retained external and ailitary control and acted as an
adviser to the new govemaent.
The govemaent was anxious to end the war, and they received over-
tures froM the iCP that it also was interested in bringing hostilities
to a close* An wuies^ wai offered to all Cooaunists who surrendered^
but Chin Peng, the Coaaunist Party leader, relUsed the aaaesty and
wanted the govemaent to lej^lise and allow the Coaaimist Party to carry
on political activity without restraint* since this would aaount to a
victory for the defeated Coaaunists if accepted, the Govemaent refused
these terms and withdrew the offer of aanesty in February of 1956.
On August 31, 1957, the Federation of Xalaya received its ind^
pendcnce, but the British agreed that they would continue to take part
in the war against the CoosRtnists. Although the eaergency was feraally
ended in July of I960, the Conainist activity in /4alaya continues to
this day* The jungles still hold a saall scattered force of die-hard
terrorists who find eoafort in the thot^ht that it took Mao T30-tung*s
0»»;,
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forc«9 thirty y««rs to win China* Howvcr, th« ^afllct has shifttd
froa on« of anMd opposition to that of Infiltration and subversion*
In fUMiationy ona n««d only ccttpara the experiancc of tht Malayan
Coaaunist guarrlUa vlth the adviea of Mao to datcrainc the prioary
reason for their failure* Hao staud that guerrilla warfare oust fail
if its political objectives do not coincide vith the aspirations of the
people and if their sya^tt^^, cooperation u^ assistance camwt be
gained* The British succeeded in driving a "vedge*" between the guer-
rillas and the population} and after accoi^jlishing this« the ultiaate
result was aercly a aatter of tiae* It should be aentioned that the
distinctive divisions of the Malayan society into Chinese, Initim^ Mktf
Malay groups greatly aidad %im 9iri»li^ I» thlt ragiMtf* J^liUM^t tHa
Coaaunists had sooe tuceese vtUk Um ChUmm^ iha M«4 %m £mm aU Af
then to adopt the saae position created barriers to their doAlnation of
the other two*
Indochina (Appendix D)
The Indochinese Federation, which had been consolidated t;y the
French during the last thirty years of the nineteenth century , was aade
up of three protected kingttoast Laos, Caabodia, and Aonaa} one protected
territoxy, Tonkini and one French colony. Cochin China* early in the
twentieth centuxy, nationalist aoveaents began to develop in the Federa-
tion* The Fr«keh thenselves, l>y introducing Vestem education to the
Vietnaaescj inoculated thea vith their own ideas of revolution* Further,
Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 gave ii^Mtus to nationalist senti-
aent anoBO the Vletnaaese by daaonstrating that an Asian nation vith
i^
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sufficient Uchnical Knowledge and equipment eould prevail over a
Western pe%fer. Despite the vatchfulness of tht French authorities^
nuaerous aati*freneh secret societies sprang up. One of the best Known
was the Vietnaa Itationalist Party which staged an uiprising at Yen Bay in
1930. The uprisii^ wa« severely repressed by the French and aost of the
Party aeabers fled to Yunnan in >outhw«3t China,
After the Yen Bay insurrection, the leadership of the clandestine
Rationalist aov«aent in Vietnaa was taken over by the Indochina Connu*
nist Party. Fomed in Hong Koi^ in 1930, it united several groups under
the leadership of Bguyen Ai Quoc» later known as Hd Chi IMrh*
The pattern of FrenehF>Indochinese relations vas broken for the
first tise in thre«»quarters of a century by the fall of France in June,
19ltO. Tht local French authorities in Indochina stayed loyal to Vichy
and did not Join the Free France of General dc Oaulle. The Vichy goven^
ent continued to adainister the colore, but its tenuous control was
weakened 1^ Japanese occupation of the country. French officials were
allowed to continue to govern under the "instruction" of Japanese ad-
visers and with Japanese troopi stationed in the country. Thus for a
second tiae, the Vietnasutse were treated to the sight of an Asian nation
doainating a Western power.
During this period. Ho Chi Minh persuaded seatt of the other
nationalist groups to Join with the Coaaunists in a united front organi-
eation, the Vietnaa Independence League, later called the Viet Hinh. As
chief of the Viet Minh, Ho took great pains to plwy down his Coaaunist
background and to capitalize on the reputation he had built up as an
uneoi^roaising anti-colcmialist. One of the first actions of the Viet
? 'I'*v.- .iJii'v:*




»-Ttr*.'.'J r#«sfT «v_y <>;•*•'
ort
•?f •»& ^\.-'r :^^?^c- "1:1
mm- »ii
!f -^ rV* ** i* f?l " »:•- "^ * » .
X- *•'<?»..
-I"'. «^-*^'! *?'> ;)/ f ? y.




Kinh was to begin the fomfttion of gu«rrlllft bands » imdcr tht Ie«d«r9hip
of the Commist^ Vo IJg\^en Gii^, to op«rmt« in Victnaaes* territory
against both th« Frtnch and ths Japancsa.
With the var situation tuminB to the advantage of the Allies,
the Japanese decided to eli&imte the slight threat to their cottmmica*
tion lines which the saall raaaining vr >«:: French forces in Indochina
represented. On 9 March 19kS, the Japanese killed or iapri^oned aost of
the raoaining French colonial troops In the country. V^ith the elimina*
tion of the French, the various nationalist and Cooaamist groups began
to reorganise theaselvas In order to take over as n^idly as possible
whatever regions the Japanese did not occupy. On 7 August^i HIe> Chi
ltinh*3 guerrillas beoaaa the *'Vi«tnui Liberation Ap^." A shad^ govern-
Kent, called the "Vietnaa People's Liberation Comittee" was set i;^
during the following days with Ho as president.
In the aeantiae, the Japanese, realising th^ vara near defeat,
handed over control powers to foraer Eaperer Bao Dal. Hi was unable to
fora a govemaant, however, and decided to abdicate in the belief that a
united «kd indepcrulent naticm offered the enly possibility of preventing
the return of French control. Recognising only the nationalist character
of the Viet Alnh, he handed ovar his laperial seal and ether syiribols of
office to Ho Chi Hinh on 23 August 19U5* To the tradltion-ainded Viet-
OMi«se this clearly indicated that a great and historic shift of power
had taken place.
On "^pteaber 2, Ho Chi Kinh foraally announced the foraatlon of
his provisional govemaant and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam. To fvollitate negotiations directed toward gaining international
n .. ••'iS V
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recognition of its l«gitis«cy« Comunist dominatitm of th« prcnrisionai
govtmsent ««s cmrcf^Uy eonc««I«d und ettphftsis placed on the ^^deao-
ormtie" oh«rsot«r of its mitionalist aspirations*
The Vietnaaese^ in general^ were strongly opposed to a continua-
tion of French rule after borid war II and escpected the Allies to support
their independence, nationalist China oi^^sed the return of France to
Indochina, and the United States favored the foraation of an inter*
national trusteeshipi France, however, suppwted liy Britain, eventually
prevailed in Allied councils, and it was agreed that France would re-
occupy the area* As a preliaintry step, the British were to accept the
surrender of the Japanese south of the l6th parallel while the Chinese
perforaed a siailar duty north of it*
The first British troops arrived in ^igon in late "f^epteaber,
19l5» to be followed by the French in the following month* Alaost
imediately, the Vietnaaese rose up in defense of their nevly acquired
independence* The British, assisted by the French, put down the resist*
ancei and, by the end of liovefll>er, all strategic points vithin Cochin
China had been taken.
Vegotiations between the French and Ho Chi Mrh cosneneed ccmrip
coming the future of Vietnam* Alnost iaiaediately, differences developed
which were to aake settleaent iaposslble* French actions to enforce
eustoa^ controls in October aroused hostility* A Viet iHinh attack on a
French bulldoeer crew detailed to reoove a road block in Haiphong re-
sulted in the subsequent French bonbardaent of that city* On 19
Deceaber I9h6, the Viet Hinh attacked the French throughout Indochina*





In thi «ar]y sionUis of i9hl, th« Frtnch ailltary forces ra-
«itablish«d ttwtlr control ovtr th« prinei|}al ionrui in Tonkin and AnriMi*
This forc«d tht Viet Minh to r«§ort to tbft guarriils tacticit which
b«caH« tte ehiaf characteristic of the war* Ho Chi Minh's araed forces
made use of the jungle and hills to neutralise the French laechttnized
Mobility and power* By selecting their objective and retiring when they
at su^rior strength, they presented a prdblea vith which the French
could not cope* After isveral years of fighting, the Viet Nir^ controlled
large areas in the North, the Central Lowlands, and the >outh} the French
had firm control only in the large cities* The situation slowly degcn*
erated into a staleaate*
In March of i9h9, France finally approved of self*gov«maent for
VietnMi within the French Union* 8ao Dai assumed the role of Chief of
Statei but the Viet Minh and the principal nationalists, including Mgo
Dinh Oiea, the present ruler of South Vletoaa, failed to unite behind
Dai because they claiaed that the French did not offer real independence*
Although the State of Vietnaa was permitted adainistrative autonoay and
an aray of its own, strong safeguards to protect FreiMSh ecMuaie inter»
ests were oaintained, and the foreign policy of the new state was co*
erdlnated with that of France.
There were new two govennenti in Vietnas, both clalaing to be
the govemaent of the entire country* During this period. Ho Chi Hinh
rid his govemaent of the aoderatee whoa he had accej^d earlier and
showed htaself to be cos^lete ly Coaaonist* Propaganda eatanating froa
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In •urly 19^0, ftfUr tht Vitt Kinh btgan to r«c«iv« assistance
tttm Cesaunlft China, offansiv« aetion was lattiatad against th« Preneh
forces vhich were defeated In a nuaiMir of strategic locations* Za 195l>
tht advances of the Coommist forces In Vietnaa were teaporarlly halted
ifith ths aid of Aaerican equlpaent and a? a result of a cniclal error in
the tactics of the Viet Hinh«^^ Hovever, tn 19$2, the Coaaunlsts
started a new offensive in several areas} nttd It Itecaae obvious that
France f even supported by Qon-Coaminlst Vietnanese natimuilist forces
and Aaerican aid^ could not achieve a satisfactory solatia In Indochina
by ailitary Means*
By late 1953» the Coeeunist regiae in ilorth Vietsaai^ desjplU its
llitazy successes, 9kpp69Jdtd viUing to coae to a negotiated 9«ttle«ent-*
an attitude no dou^t influenced hy fear of poislble active Aaerican
participation in the war and the nev soft line adopted at the tine hy
tilt "Soviet Union. In April cf l9Sk, representatives et the Vnlted
States, France, Great Britain, Cownmlst China, the Soviet Union, Laos,
Caabodia, the Itate of Vietnaa, and the Oeaeeratie Hepuhlle of Vietnaa
net at Geneva to arranse terms of a truce* The decisive French defeat
In May, at the supposedly stroi^ly fortified position vhich they had
established near the saall aountain vlllajie of DIen Blen Phu, increased
papular pressure in France for a rt^ld cone lu;i Ion of hostilities.
^^ncouraged by their success In 1951, the Coaenunlst attested to
breaK through to Hanoi, their foraer capital, by seans of engasins the
French forces in conventional warfare* In a serle^iE of three battle?,
while operating on the plains where th£ Irtiich fla^trajectoiy weapms










A ailitmry tntctf vas signed on Jaly 21 vhieh partitioned tho
country at the l7th parallel* It provided for tim total evacuation of
Vietnan north of the 17th parallel by the allitary forces of the French
and the Uate of Vietnam as well as for the evacuation of ttw south by
the Viet Minh forces.^ laport? of nev veapons vere Halted to replace*
•ent levels. The agreeacnt stipulated a period of three hundred diys
during ifhieh freedom of ooviment vas to be allowed for all persons
trishins to aove froa one sector to the other* An International Control
Coanisslon, with representatives froa India (chalraan)^ Canada, and
Poland, vas formed to supervise the truce arrangeaents*
Vith the Geneva Agreement, the government of Flo Chi Minh trans*
ferred its capital to Hanoi and moved steadily to achieve it? program of
eomaumisation north of the 17th parallel* The French, with their
veteran, well-trained, well-equipped, acchanleed ari^ had been driven
out of Iforth Vietnam* An analysis of vt^ and how this happened can best
ba studied within a framework of the two major aspects of the guerrilla
aetivityi the political and the ailitery*
Politically, the French failed to take advantage of the jtrong
nationalistic movemant in Vietnam as a source of ^strensth against the
guerrillas* The French wrongly thought that the only alternative before
tham in Vietnam vai victory for the French or victory for the Viet-
namese Communists I whereas another alternative existedt victory for the
Vietnames nationalist. In reality, this was a war that France^ as an
^^splte the agreement, a well-organized Viet Hinh underground




ol^fkshioR^d colonial pover* could not hop« to vlni tut Fraac* could
tev« tssurod the victexy of Vittrauuse nationAllsa over tht Coanunist
p«rvBrsi«i of nfttionallsa Knovn «s the Vl«t Hinh by tstabiishlog and
raeognixlng a truly ind«p«nd«nt^ pro-French nationaliatic sovemiMint.
Proa the first, therefore^ the choice before the French mu not between
keeping Vletnan and losing it, but between losing it to the CoanuAists
anl losing it to the nationallstsi in the end, it was lost to both* The
friimdly relations between itelaya and Cireat Britain today, as coapared
vith the present relations between France and ttorth Vietnaa, speaks
loudly for the logic of prwioting national isa as a weapon against the
Coaiainist guerrilla instead of letting the guerrilla hide behind its
facade*
Having failed to establish a govemaent which the aajority of the
Yietnaaese could support, the French further alienated the population by
the action of the troops in the field* For exaaplc, Bernard B* Fall
tells of his personal experience while on an airborne supply aission
with the French* As their cargo plane was on its way bacK to Saigon
after a parachute supply drop, it received soae daaage froa ene^
aaehine gun fire fron the groui^* The navigator inforaed two French
escort fighters of the daaage* The fighters peeled off and proceeded to
napala and strafe the nearest village* Fall observed at the tiae that,
"He don*t even know whether the village was pro^^oaaunist or not***^^
?^emard &* Fall, ?tree t
.^.^^^ Jj^* Xn<tochina at ^, lpl6»
19$it (Harrisburg, Peansylvanial"" '^tacigjole, 1961), p. 10^
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In contrast, th« Viet Mlnh adopted the ideas of Kao Tse-tung and
i&ade it one of their prioMixy c^Jectives to gain the support of the
people. They initiated a policy of propaganda and indoctrination which
vas aimed at "persuading" and "convincing" the inhabitants of the
countryside of the visdom of jupporting their "nationalistic" cause
against the French and U* S. "io^Mrialists." Political coaaissars vere
part of the oconand structure of the Viet Minh Amy down to the platoon
level and sometimes lover. When it caae to priorities of ailltary or
political objectives, the political cooaissar had the final word. For
instance, if an attack on a particular government- controlled village
aight result in excessive reprisals or undue alienation of the civilians,
it iRmld be canceled over the head of the tactical CMuaander. Saall
wonder that the vast loajority of the population supported the Viet Kinh,
providing thea with the necessary intelligence and logistic support
which is ^o necessary in a guerrilla operation.
Militarily, the situation in Vietnam might be best summed up in
tlw following words
t
The tragedy of Indochina is that a primitive ara^, consisting
mostly of riflemen, was able to defeat an array equipped with
modem weapons largely because its bold and novel tactics vera
not countered with equal audacity.^^
The tactics of the Viet Hinh guerrillas were based on the prin-
ciples of speed, mobility, surprise, superior strength at the point of
contact, and hasty withdrawal. Their tactics were those of terror,
attacking isolated strong points, and imibuahir^ patrols and supply
2ilaaar H, Prosser, "The Blood^y Lesson of Indochina," The Amy
Combat Forces Journal, June 1955, p. 23.
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convoys • TY»3« tsctics took •xIbum ftdv«nt»ge of two «ost loportant
A99«tst suptrlor eeiAwt int«lligcao« «nci t^K terrain* Th« Vi«t Minh
tAforsuitlon on the stren^jth^ location^ snd aoveaent of the sncay accrued
to thca as a rcault of their control of the population* The terrain of
Vietnam with its cleiue jungle, hi^h elephant graii^ and rice paddies
provided the cover and concealaent for the attack, and ttm sanctuazy for
the vithdraiial*
French ailitary tactics, in the tradition of conventional Western
warfare, stewted froa a futile search for conventional set-piece battles
in vhich the eneoy could i^e isolated, forced to sake a stand, and hope-
fully be annihilated* The tragec^ of this policy was that they finally
found such a battle at Dien Bien Phu, but only after the Viet Minh had
passed into their third, or con^mntional phase, and had the organisation,
training, equipswnt, and bases of supply to defeat the French*
Further, with the possible exception of Leclerc and De Lattre,^^
the French lacked the **offensive spirit" vhieh is so necessary to win
this type of mrfare* It eaonot be denied that a certain "Kasinot Line^
or "vail psychology*' spirit developed in the French High Coaaand* For
exafl^le, aore than ten thousand fort 3, bunkera, ana concrete eaplaceaents
,
^^ecltfrc, who vas the Conttander-ifvn^ief of the French t^cpedl*
tiofiary Forces \A\lch first re^ocoupled Vietnaa, vas able to clear an
area of about seventy thousand atiles in less than five weeks and vlth
i*a$ than a lUll division* He accoi^lished this i.y aakiag full tise of
the aoidility of his airborne and araored imits* De Lattre ias respon-
sible for saashing the Viet Hlnh thm^t toward ftenoi in 1^51, and,
utilizing tiia fortified Ked River .«;<i«.«i «;> a base, he e;<ecuted deep
stabs into Viet Mlnh positions using paratroopers and araored units*
Leclerc was relieved by General Valluy, and died soon after* De Lattre
died and was succeeded by General salan*
I (-•!£*«*>
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totaling nore than flv« aiillion tens of conerttc^ vtrc built in and
around tht Rtd Rivtr D«lta« Th« whole tactical concept vms built around
the tha«« of "hold that lina.*^ The occupation of these fort3 ioac^i-
lized at fron 120,000 to lliO^OOO troops. And by no acans did these
forta prevent the infiltration of Viet Minh eleoents. Conservative
intelligence estlaates place the nuaber of Vict Minh troops operating
vithin the delta at around thirty thousand aen.^^ A fVirther reiult of
these (tefensive positiona was that, vtille the French were setting behind
their fortified encaopaents, the Viet Minh were actively consolidating
their cwitrol over the pojxilation in the surrounding rural areas.
One other exoiaple of the '^wsll'^ tactics was the holding of nearly
a half dozen isolated fortresses far behind Vict Kinh lines, sooe as far
as three hundred iiiles inside Coaaunist territory. The tactical value
of having about twenty to thirty thousand excellent troops bottled up
hundreds ox miles behind eneoy lines in the Jungle cannot be justified
reodiJIy. Dispersed as they were, these troops could not make sorties
into eneay supply lines, which, by the way, had long since been using by-
pass routes far around the French hedgehogs. Probably the situation in
which the French found theiftselves could be best sunoutd up in the fol-
lowing quotation!
The carrying out of the war was for the French itxpeditionary
Corps a continuous process of dispersal of forces. The eneay
divisions were split into regiments, then into battalions,
eoi^Muiies and platoons, to be stationed at thousands of points
^^Bemard B. Fall, "Indochina* The Sewn-Year Dileaaa," ?to<tern
Querrilla Warfare
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Franklin M. Osanka (ed.), (Mew Yorki The Free Press
of Qlencoe, 1962), p. 259.
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•nd posts on the various battlefronts of the Indochliui theat«r of
oporatioaa. Tht omny found hlosoif faco to face vith » eon-
tradictiom Without 3catt«ring hia forc«j It vaj ioipossiblc for
hia to occupy tho invadod torritoryi in scattering his force s^ ha
put hiaself in difficulties. His scattered units would fall easy
prey to our troi^^ his aoibile forces would be aere and aore ra«
dueed and the shortage of troops would be all the acre acute. On
ths other hand, if he concentrated his forces to aove froA ths
defensive po<;ition and cope vith us with nore initiative, the
ocetq^atioft forces would be weakened and it would be difficult for
hio to hold the invaded territory. Hov, if the enea^ gives up
occt4>ied territory* tls vary aia of tht war of ni»cooqpiest is
defeated.27
In 7\flmation, ths French nilitary defeat, although certainly
hastened by their '^wiill*' tactics, derived priaari ly froo political
defeat. The political battle could have been won wily if the French had
been able to establish political obkctfves satisfactory to both the
French a»! the VIctnmese. To be acceptable to the Vietnaoeiie, the
political objectives had to be oore than a rallying cry of •'Down with
Ceaaunisn.*' The Vietnaaese needed a realf^itic prograa which proitised to
satisfy i^^itiottte nationalistic objectives. The French were unable to
develop such a political prograa which would be acceptable both at hoac
and in Vletnm, and hence the French ailitaxy effort was dooaed to
failure. As Marshall Leclerc said while he was Coamanden>ii><:hief in
Indochina} "Anti-Connunisa will reaain a useless tool in our hands as
long as the probleas of nationalisa reaain unsolved. '^^^
27aeneral Vo Xj^iyen Qiap, People* s War Pe(^ie*« Araiy (Mew Yorki
Frederick A. Praager, 1962) , p. 1^.
28Bemard B. Fall, street ^it^K>ut J^, igp, ^•t P« 6«
fttn^
CmPTEH IV
A rmtmiom for AirriMaucFiRZLLA poucy
TlMt CfUicept of su«XTilla vBrf»r« <So9s not provide a fie«t forauls
for all situations, Gocd Judi^nt rath«r than doetrlnfi siust gow
raspofue to actual or potential indurs«ncy in 3p«cific c«>untrle3. Hov^
tv«r« the previous chapters have shown that certain baste principles do
evolve vhish can tm of soae use In coaddatins the problea* It vlll be
the purpose of this chapter to compile these principient into a fr«K«»
vor^ ior ant i->9uerrilia policy*
In countries not yet plagued by ara^d warfare, the govcmaent
ust work to eliminate those conditio!^ that give rise to the problen*
5;|)acifically^ they should aia tai
1, Induce the elite to launch neet^d refoms.
2. Proa9>t the people to identify theaselvvs with the national
Sevenwent*
3« Proaote ecMM&ic and social ioproveaent at a rate fast enough
to convey an iaage of progress.
li* Help provide opportunities for earear advancei&ent of all
people including those not of the elite.
5. Enlist the syapathy of the pe^le for the aracd force;? by
encouraging nilitary discipline and aiding civic action prograias.
6. I^rove the Motivation and efficienoy of bureaucracies.
In a country that is being threatened by guerrilla imrfare, the









ciMiblMtion of counter^ teohniquos, prloarlly of « allitary, psychological
and political aature^^ the gutrrillat can b« pr«v«nted from achieving
thtir aajor o^jactlvis. for purpesas of clarity and continuity, ay disi-
ens sion vill b« brokan down into thasa three aajor fialdsi hovevar> it
aust be ra»atft>arad that it is is^posstbla to separate any of ttea in
actual practice and the ^ucoesaful cimtaimant of any threat of guer-
rilla warfare ii dependent upon the inter-relation and full developinent
of all of these factors. Qenerally, they oust be pursued siaultaneouialy
since success, or lack of it in one area, vill determine progress in the
others. For example, as va have Just shown in Indochina, the French, by
being unable to iapleaent a proper political prograa^ wtre unable to
ailitarlly defeat the insurgents.
One other aspect of the inter-relation of these three fields
should be aentioned at this tioe. Without d^ynamlc and ^sitive leader*
ship, it is very doubtful that any ant i- guerrilla program will achieve a
significant degree of success. The exaaples of Parages in Greece,
Magsi^say in the Philippines, and Teapler in Malaya underline the ia»
portanc« of proper leadership. Often in history a critical situation
has seaaed to call forth an irxceptional Individual who vas able to cope
vith eaargencies and to vfn out in what i^^peared to be, at the beginning,
a lost cause, ^e cosnonly speaK of the "aan of the hour.** Truly such
ntn are necessary In a developing country faced with a guerrilla problem.
^In the political sphere viii b€ Included thos# aspects of an









Frott « purely atlitary point of vtcv« aati-giuiiTilU opcrfttiona
may b« suMed ^p in tvo vordst Isolation tad «r«dtc«tlen« I^olfttlon hos
Jb««R best aocoiq^Ilshed fey the "rcsottXuutnt** progratts in vhieh the giter-
rlUo hns been separated from his popular base of atqpporty the papula*
ttOA* RcsettlesMtnt vas sueeessl^lly eaployed vith the Chinese squatters
in Hala^ and is nov being attested In south Vietnam^ where » X night
•dd, the conditions are not exactly siallar and the results will probably
not be as spectacular*
In Kalsya, it vas practically ii^ssible for the guerrillas to
live off the Jungle. In Vietna»y the conditions are soaevhet better^
especially vhen considering tht availability of external stq^ply, and the
loss of one source of food supply viU not be so critical. In Mali^,
the guerrillas were predoainantly Chinese mad, by isolating these people
frott the guerrillas^ it was possible to Unit the aaount of popular
suQiport* In Vietnaa^ there Is no distinctive ethnic characteristic to
detemlne who Is probi^ly friendly to the guerrillas and who is not.
Thus 9 it is necessary to resettle practically the entire rural pepula*
tion« In Malaya, the resettleaent of the Chinese aqpiatters did not
cause oany hamful side effects sin^ the Brisks Plan generally ii^»roved
the level of llvii^} for those who were aoved. In Vletnaa^ aany of the
families are being taken from faniiy plots i^lch th«y have worked all
their life and beii^i placed in conditions which are Initially not greatly
su^rior to i^t they had* This has resulted In soae haraful social and
ee^uwic aide effects* It Is ii^aortant to renwiber that when calculating
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j^egrwm, full wight aust b* giv«& to such political^ econoaic, and
social side effects 9 since thfcy often oay be extreaely hart'iful. It
should be added that a properly run reiettleaent plan can aecoaplish a
great deal In bringing the govcmaent closer to the people, and this
will probably be its gi-«atest virtue in Vietnaa.
Another facet of isolation is to cut off the rebels froa iources
of supply outside the country. This is frequently tht aost difficult
tasK of all. Where a border runs through jungle or oountainous country*
it is virtually iopossible to block all trails and by-vays. This haa
been ths situation in Laos and south Vietnwi where the guerrillas have
received a great deal of support fron Herth Vietaaa over the Ho Chi Kinh
trail* ilDiMver, soae effort aust be aade in this regard.
The ultiaate teehni(|ue in isolating guerrillas froa the people ii
to persuade the people to defend theaselves. As the resettleaent plans
becoae effective, Hoae Ouard forces should be trained to take over the
protective duties of the villages* This acooaplishes a dual functions
(1) It releases aore regular A ray forces for offensive operationi and
(2) once a substantial nuober of acabers of a oooaiinity coaait violence
on behalf of the govemaent, they have gone far to break petvanently the
tie betiMen thit eoaaunity and the guerrillas.
The basic principle of eradication is offensive operations vhieh
dei^ the guerrillas ths initiative. The guerrilla strategy, in turn, viU
be to atteapt to seise and hold the initiative by aeunting a variety of
attacks against fixed installations, so that large govemnent forces are
pinned down defending towns and villages, rail lines, power lines, port
-^ til iHi litv
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9Dd othtr vttAl instalUtions. A count«r>guirrlUa dXfcnslw, tfmri,
vlll havit thtst obj«ctiv«it
1« To kMip gucrriUa unlta off telaneo at aU tia«s| to force
then to flee continuously from attacking govamatnt units , and thart^
to aiAlmisa thalr opportunitits to aount attacks on vital eauRinieatlon
lines «id ailltaty installations or to lay aabushas.
2. By aaintaining tho initiative, to force guerrilla units to
overrun their intelligence icreanit and thereby to deny thea the pro*
teetiVB cover they need to survive against superior ailitary forces.
3« To prevent guerrilla forcej froa grouping for strong attacks
against isolated points.
U* To tire thea out, and Keep thea tired out, thr^i^ ctmstant
offensive action against thea| to force thea into aore isolated hinter-
lands where food supplies are less and less available*
Conventional forces with hiavy equipaent in field foraatioa tend
to cluster together, centralising their pover on terrain that allovs
easy aaveaent* In coabat, rigid adherence to the principle of concen-
tration keeps units at umriel^y battalion or even regiaental levels,
usually with erroneous stress on holding land rather than destr^ing
eneay forces. Therefore, the core of the countex^guerrilla troops aust
be a highly aobile attacking force. Noraally, it need not be 3td>stan>
tially larger than the guerrilla eleaents opposed to it. It should be
able to aeet and defeat guerrilla forces essentially en their own terasf
that is, vith snail aobile units capable of aoving in patrols over
extended periods in eneay territory. These oiobile striking forces
require the very best regulars, organised and trained to fight
,.•1 a^ i Am mt: y] ,i
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tiaerthodoxly. Th«y caimet consist of hftttlly r«cirult4id mnd tit>in«d pro-
|ov«rfn«Rt eiviliaiu} on th« cmArBoy, tiity miat b€ tou(}h» dlscipiin«<i
9a& thoroughly profesaionaX*
The op«rmtionftl concept of an antl*j^rrf IXa e«^lga eoiil<I be
Oitablished aa follotisi A 8ii«rrUia- ifif«9t«d part of the cotmtry Is
taarked off and dlvldod Into 3«ettoaa« Eaeh soctlen Is patrellad lay on«
of tha Boblla striking forces^ but all are In contact with a central
haadquarters, vhloh In ttim has a reserve force at Its dlspoiel. Upon
CMitactlns guerrlllasf a patrol alerts headquarters and adjac^t patrols*
As the latter converge, headqi»rters dispatehss paratroops or he IIcaters
to drop troops behind the eneey who Is 3urroun(^d and destr^red* Oaoe
an area Is peclfled, tht sovemi&ent consolidates Its control and pro-
vides continued protection by use of Hoako Qttard, nllltia, or vugoented
police units. T^ ooblle striking forces are m&v^d on to areas still
Infested vlth guerrillas. The mln li^redlents then are constant
patrols, good cooaimlcatlon facilities, rapid nd:>lll^ and a capacity
for rapid concentration.
Counter* guerrilla operations oust cause ninlnua hara to the
people, lest they becose antagonistic to the govemaent. The troops
ttst be highly disciplined to respect civilian rights and pr^>erty.
Cargo planes should carry In si;g3plles, so tt«t the forces do net have to
live off the countzy-slde. The onus for antl*civillan behavior should be
diverted to the guerrillas theaselves.
One flmil points It Is erroneous to think that nllltairy defeat
pure and sli^le vlll be the final solution. Unless the p^Mlatlon has
been veaned avay froa the gwrrllla and his cause, unleis reforas and
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r«»«dbieation havtt uttacked the psychological biis« of giwrrlllii action,
unless the political nettfork bacHlng his up has been d«3tr«y«ci, allitary
defeat is only a pause and fight ins can easily eruQjt again. Good troops
coploying proper tactics cannot make up for an tansound govemaental and
political iMse* Let us then isove en to sone of the other aspects of a
couf^er-guerrilla operation.
The Psychological Phase
Sl«ultaneeusly vith Its military ^)eratiens» the govermsent mist
also aount an extensive psychological caapaign consisting of ^tiiotfaaf
tion, education, and propaganda. This cai^ig^ can be divided into tvo
rather distinct categoriest (1) Those elesients which are specifically
directed toward the forces of the encay aAd are designed to underline
his vill to resist! and (2) those eleaents which contribute to the
Morale and allegiance of the population. We shall deal with the forsier
first.
kfhile the official stateaents of the govemaent oust continue to
drive hoae the point that there can be no oosqsroaise or agreenent with
the rebellious aoveoient itself, except <m gowraaent tertts, a very dif-
ferent approach can be nade to the individual aenbers of the guerrilla
aovenent. Psychological warfare should be used extensively to persuade
thatt to coae out of the Jungle and surrender. The use of loudspeakers
carried in aircraft , radio broadcasting qperation<< and the dropping of
thousands of leaflets, proaising iaaunity to thos« who surrendered unless
tirny were guilty of notorious criaes, proved aodsrately successful in




«ff(ietiv« If they ar« iaipl«iB«nt«(i In ptrleda i^n th» insurgtnt atoveaent
hu b«tn 3lov«ci devn or hks just act a decisive ekifeftt of ton* ulna*
In periods 9uch as these, the iadividbual guerrilla is pertieulariy
vulnerable to pfyehological operations. The general theae stressed
should 2>e that the guarrillas are cmight in a hopeless ailitaxy situa-
tion, a»! that they are fraa to choose betwten a rotten jungle existence
probaJbly csuXainating in death, or a rehabilitated life in society.
Hehobilitation centers should iM opened vhere the Cowauaiata uho sur-
render can be re-educated and returned to civilian life.
Another aspect of the psychological operations i^ch are directed
tovard the guerrilla is the offering of large rewards for the capture of
leading terrorists. This has the dual effect of not only aaking the
guerrilla leaders wuy of exposing vhcaselves to the civilian populace,
vho oay turn theat in, but it causes suspicion and dissension to crop ^p
asiong the ranks of the guerrilla themselves, vhten the reiiards reach a
siae that it becoa^s extresaely profitable for any one of then to becosie
an inforaer.
The payaent of infomers and rewards oust be decentralised to the
loviitst field coBBBanders. In order to Motivate tht flow of current useful
inforoation, iaaediate full paysent, or at least partial payaent, aust
be mde t^rever possible. The rewards aust also be %forthi^ile, and
should «^|»t>xiiaate cash suas for iiftiich the aiiwrage citizen would vork
aonth»»-and in iiaq;»ortant cases years—>to ac^lr $ and save in ordinary
labor. The effectivemss of juch a prograa can be illvuitrated by the
fact that Luis Taruc, the head of the Philippine Coaaunist guerrilla
aoveaent, with a hundred thousand pesos price on his head, becwse so
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distrustful of his own coarvdss thst he would Ut only his fmily
approach hia. His eventual surrMMter mis attrUauted to aor«t out of ftar
for his life J than for political roasons.
In r«9ard to its proor**^ tevard the ganaral public « the govem*
aant should hBv« two basic obJ«ctiv«si (l) To incraasa the gaoarml
scnsa of security on the part of the populatieni and (2) obtain fron the
paople a greater dagraa of coMtitatatnt in the strusgl* against the Co«»
aunists* Initially^ thesa two object ivas aay create a diiaaaa for the
govemnent. To ask for greater coMiitaent on the part of the public is
to aaks then assuoe greater risHs and thus increase their sens^ of in*
security. As long as the govemaent is unable to guarantee security for
all 1^0 are willing to stand up to the guerrillas^ the govemaent cannot
expect ouch active public support* by far, the largest part of aiiy
population will not voluntarily risk reprisals even though their syapa*
thies nty be stron^.^. Instead, they will sit en the sidelines ^ilc
others battle it out. Joining in c»Uy when the outcoiae becoaes a foregone
conclusion. It is only as the araed forces are able to deaonstrate a
degree of ailitary effectiveness against the eneay that it is possible
for the govemaent to ask the public to becoae actively involved. Here
again we sea that the active proaotlon of one phase of an ant 1- guerrilla
pregraa, the ailitary, deteraines the success of another, the psycho-
logical.
Probably one of the aost effective aeans »t gaining the st^iport
of the population is the Civil Actiim prograas carried out by the aill*
tacy forces. By working directly with the indigenous population, in the
iaaediate zone of operations, helping to establish schools, build roads.
t-
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giving 9ftnitmry and agricultursl service, distribttting food and assist-
ing rescttlaoent, tht military can often sake a significant contribution
toward increasing the prestige of the central authority. But the nili*
taxy can (toal in this field only in a limited vay during periods of
heavy operations. Their prlanry and principal aissitm reaains the
defense of the country and ot /;; r prograas are needed to win the confi-
dence of the population.
The Government has to present its programs in vays which are both
imderstandable and credible to the mass of the population. These pro-
grams and their results must appear sufficiently attractive and attainable
to mahe the people identify their ovn hcnoes for the future vith the sur-
vival of the govemaent rather than its overthrow ai^ removal. In this
regard, the gevemment oust eoeqpete vith the rebel propagandist who can
offer the "moon** to all who will support the insurrection. B%A ths
govemoent must stick to the facts or <;oaethirM3 vexy close to them be-
cause the people know that the government has the authority, and they
astume that it has the power to make good on its promises. Therefore, an
information and indoctrination program which is direct and, to a large
degree truthful, is the government's best approach to the populatiMi.
They must explain their long-term plaas and intentions for the develoi^
aent of the country and the benefit of the people. Show what is being
done to farther these plans and call for the cooperation and support of
the population in preventing the rebels from ii^cding and wrecking these
plans. If the government does indeed have a feasible and attractive
prograa and is clearly working hard to put it into effect, the^e appeals
can have great intact.
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The govsmacnt may soMctlocs spr«ad inforaation that i v^.^^..-
•r«<! clasaifUd, l>tc«U9« iwMdiatc and convincing r«port« of AUce«3SfUl
ilitaxy operations arc the bast aaans of persuading tha ptopla that
fupport of tha guerrilla is umrise. In this reg^urd, however , it does
not pay to tell lies about the guerrilla operation^ because the civilian
target of the program vill often knov aore about the guerrillas than
does the govemoent.
In all their inforetation and education prograas« the authorities
aust take great care not to confuse people vho are potentially sya^M*
thetic to the guerrillas vith the guerrillas theaselves. For exaaple«
Luc tan Pye points out In his stucfy of guerrilla Coanunisa in Xalaya,
tlMit the tesiptation to treat all Malayan Chinese as potential guerrillas
or Coaaunists vas veiry great* To have sucouirised to this, however, vould
have aeant establishing the very link vhich the govemnent is trying to
break. The entire psychological operation aust be directed toward
separating the guerrilla froa the population* once this is achieved,
ailitary success vill follov*
The Political Phase
In counter*guerrilla operations, political action cannot be
separated froa ailitaxy action. Every Military operation aust be Mighed
vith res^rd to its effect on the political picture, every political
aeve for its effect on the ailitasy situation. As vith the guerrillas
theaselves, political considerations aay often have to over>ride allitary





eonsidsrctiens IX pcnuuitnt suecvss is to be •ohl«v«d. Taetteal vic-
tories ort of little value if thty coo^^roaise the strategic objective.
Since this objective is control of the population, this is one type of
wftr in which frien(it>or-foe thinking is inapplicable*
The aost urgent need for ths govcrnstent I9 to Identify itself
vlth the needs and aspirations of the people, for this is the only vmy
to build a solid t»%« of voiontMty and i^olehearted 3ui;^}ort. The
obvious first itep in such a program is to allay the grievances that
originally pemitted the outbreak of violence. Obviously ik» nation,
particularly tme which is underdeveloped and subjected to serious grow*
ing pains, can transfom itself into a prosperouj and stable country
overnight, but positive and well-opubliciaed steps have to be taken to
ii^irove existing conditions. The removal of official corruption at the
local levels, refora of land-tenure arrangeaents, improved public health
provisions, li^roved schools, reasonable rent, eredit and u. faclli*
ties, sii^ie Bodem tools, better reeds and coawunicat Ions are exai^les
of moves which will help both In actually iaprovlng the standard of
living and productivity of the pe^le and in convincing them of the
govemwnt*s genuine concern and interest in their welfare.
Hawever, refora is not as easy as it may seem. The adainlstra>
tion of refora aust not soea to be sli^ly responding to the program of
the guerrillas. Economic and social problems must be attacked on their
own merits, and not as if Uii government were Itself a political party.
Further, the granting of any privileges involves its witMraval from
someone else, and in the underdeveloped countries i^re privilege and
WMlth are concentrated in the leadership group ItseU, the laeaediate
i^
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•ad ippurvnt losers tn a period of reform ftr« this itat leadership
group. rhtr«l9r«, the govemwent I9 pushed into o political (n>m«r* If
ttii rofonu are net actequate^ the aaes of the people mxy shift toward
suqoportins the rebels* On the ether hand^ if the reforiM are not under-
stood lay the leadership class or If they seea excesilve to thea, there
if likely to be splits within this group^ with Its aceoi^anyins veakeiv»
lag of the 0ovenuent*s power*
A good exoMple of this dileiua ooneems the fostering of political
aetivity^ includins political groups erltlcal of sewemnent policy,
mmms the aasses* Despite the obvious disadvantages of tuch a prograa
to the leadership group, such activity is necessaty because It provides
a third choice for discontented persons otherwise forced to choose
between supporting the govemaent or the guerrillas* It nust be reaesi^
bered that the problem of countering the appeal of eowKinisa doe<3 not
lie priaari ly in prociaiaing axtemative ideologies or policies* Ce«^
wnuki-i^ ^.mt hold becaoise It expiolti real aapiratlons and convictions,
not thrcAigh any aagle power* Therefore, the situation calls for the
creation of alternative oeans by which the people In changing societies
oaa becooe a part of the aodem world* There Is a need for a wide
variety of new ergaaisations which can satisfy the social needs of
po^le who feel ('uprooted" and are In search of new bases of identlfl*
cation* Such organieations, besides aeeting the real needs of the
people, also becoae the channels through whi :h the values and aspira-
tions of the aaeses are articulated, and as such, are the I»sis for a
msn-i coherent system of politics*
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In suABfttion, wtet is required first is a prograa of social
refora. :ecoadiy« and equally ioip9rtant> is the need to indicate seoc
effort and pro0ress on the long path to aodemissation. Finally, ^Attv
those efforts are coabined vith tone att«apt to broaden the political
organixaticoi of tht country, the government can hopefully inspire ths
confidence of the population which vill allow It to defeat the guerrilla
flusvettent.
Neveirttr, in today* t rapidly changing worlds fev of the under^
developed states can do this alone ana unaided. Invariably th» United
States, as tha leader of the Free World, i^ dravn into these difficult
sitiiaticns. Our success, or failure^ in Alpine the:;8 countriei, vill
^MpetiC to a great degree upon tne poxlciei %^iich lie adopt in their
regard* Let as nov sxaaine sooc of these possible policy laplications
and the problems vtdch tiuy Involve*
Policy la^lications for the United States
k particular danger to the Free World is the fact that the Com>
aunists have learned to exploit iats of liberation regardless of the
political leaning of the liberation aoveaent In question. They rccog*
nice the fact that in %iars of liberation the revolutionary leaders, vhen
failing to achieve their goal, vill often grasp at any outsida assist*
ance. The Caaounists are alvays vllling to aatee this saaill down ps^rsent
on a possible Aittire satellite. This situation createi an especially
difficult problea for the United 'States. Froir our point of view, not
all insurgent aoveaents are bad, nor are all revolts Coaiamist directed
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Insurrection, f«c«s an exceedingly difficult end soaetioej delicate task
in detcminino If an insurgent aoveaent in fact involves Ceaounist in-
ipirati(«f support, or exploitation, and to what degree.
The initial decision then, is to determina whether the United
SItates should or should not support a country which requests our aid
when threatened by revolution and insurrection, ^iae^ the United States
is presently ^'allied'' with aK>st of the free eWorld countries ijy oeans of
aid programs or alliancej| and if it can be determined that the revol\;t>
tien is, in fact, Cootaunist directed or exploited, the answer to ^such a
question is relatively siapie. \j\ir security interests dictate that we
support such a govemtsent. On the other hand, if the revolution is a
true revolution, that is one of justified "nationalistic'' origin, it
behooves tt» United States to take up a neutral attitude until the out-
G0«e of the revolution is detemined. Cur only actions should be those
directed toward preventing the Comsaxnists froa taking over or e^loiting
the revolution. Certain^, decisions juch as these are not easy onej,
but it falls to our political leaders, with the assistance and advice of
the local ("aabassador teams,** to aake the correct choice.
If the decision to intervene is oade, the United states is still
la a difficult position. If hostilities tend to go against the recipient
goverment, the ikoount of United states contributions tends to increase,
with eaphasis on the military end o£ the scale. The confidence inispired
by this increased Aacrlcan backing may tea^t the leaders to defer the
very reforms \ihich the American aid was intended to facilitate, the
reasoning being that the regime is now so firmly entrenched and backed









ifj ? nop a'«.'t
governacnt's offieUl policy lifM Is usually that ftorma will b« eoap
sidert4 aad srwiUd only aftor the Insurgents have bten defeated and
peace restored. Such a policy la the hig^u-ead to disaster. No aatter
hov sincere and vail intantioned tha leaders aay h9 In their stateaents
on future iaproveaents , they are Incvitab iy judged by their actlens| and
in a war in vhieh st^iport of the population is a naoassary requireaent,
such actions sust include at least a start tomrd refora and oodemisa-'
tion.
Waited Statas aid to a weak and threatened govemaeiA also has a
peculiar effact on world public opinion. Because of our long associ»-
tion with such a governoient over a period of tiae« wa soon find our-
selvaSf in the eyes of the world, responsible for the political and
eoonoaie developoent of that country. In other words, the success of
the operation becoaes a "faca- saving" devica for the United states. But
eftan in these situations, we find ourselves allied with govema^ts
which are far reiMvad froa what we consider to be a rapresentative fora
of deoocracy. Further, the suggestions i^ch we make concerning the
counter^S^rriUa operations are iu>t always it^leaented, because our
role, although It liarolves a certain aaount of powar and ability to
apply pressure, is still liaited to that of givin^g advice and aid. In
effect, the Unitad States becaaas "blactoailed'* into supporting an
undesirable and ui9q;>ular position.
But i^t are the altamatives to such a situation? Should the
United states withdraw its support and allow the gevarnaant to fall to
the Coaaunists? Again, I do not believe our sacurity interests dictate
such a solution. Or should we work to bring about the fall of the
-fij->..-.^> • .5,,.-,>B-^ • now a© ie-'"'''*' t.fli«i#«^
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0OV«ftift«nt to fore«9 other than tho«8 of the CoaOHml^ti, and th« cstab-
XishMAt of a govcrnaent which ts aor« in accord with our idaa« and
prlneipUs? '^Sueh an alUrnative is a possibility and anist h* considarad
in drastic situations,^ Hoiitv«r> X b«U«va thtrc is a third choice
available which offers greater possibilities. That is^ we can accom-
plish far aore by reaaining a part of the situation^ backing the
established govemaent, and attempting to bring about the needed social
and political rcforas^ thereby establishing that fora of govemaent
which will best represent the people* This certainly is an unenviable
position^ since we are open to critioisa froa all sides, but here we
stand and here we should st^. For those who dislike becoaing associated
with aaintaining the ** status quo*" Z ask only that yiHi propose an alten-
native solution*
Even when we are fortunate enough to back a govermsent which is
working for political and social refox« while fighting the guerrillas^
probleas continue to exist* Relationships between friendly or allied
nations are never wholly saooth and serene* Coi^lete agreeaent is
alaest in^ossible ^'etween disparate blocks of people with different
cultures, different traditions, different political systtms and who, in
aany cases, are separated by aany thousands of ailes* There is for one,
the aatter of relations between the United States instructors and foreign
personnel* The question of "Who is boss?" will always be an irritant,
and aore so in the aidst of a politie^-ailitaty conflict than in
^he situation in ::«uth Vietnaa today aight very well be approach-
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old>fashiefi«d eoinntntionftl op<r«tions. In tti«s« sireuastJaiees^ sclf-
4«nial, tact« and the ablUty to ftcevpt ottitr pe^le*i nays mmS «tti->
tttd«s mrc cssantUl for United St«t«s instructors* Further « it i^ aluo
otnfioits that allitftry aid offers an tasy target for guarrlXla propaganda.
Tht prasanea of Aaarican advlsars and instructorf can h^ axploitad to
threw doii^ OA tha patriotism and indapendanea of the ragina \m are
iiying to help. This can only be caonterad tiy tha kind of effective
public infonaatien program vhich wa discussed previously.
The a^sove situations^ with no end in sight and no clear-cut
"victory" likely in the foreseeable future , represents a stue^ in frus-
tration for nany Aaarlcans. >hooting war, even though on guerrilla and
counter*guerrilla lave Is > adds the heat of bloodshed to tha frustratiag
eircumstai^es* The resulting sense of anger leads aany A«er leans, and
others, to ttml that we are fol loving a *'no win*" poii^, even though
they theaselves can advance no feasible alternatives. Aeeordtf^ly, our
greatest needs over the next decade viU be for realisa, patience, and
sustained initiative. This can be best realised by first establishing
what tha Aaerican purpose and strategy is in regard to helping countries
threatened by this form of warfftre. Z believe that this Is best stated
fay II. tf. Rostow as followst
M0, too, recognise that a revolutionary process is undena^.
Ip^e are (^dicated to tha proposition that this revolutionary
process of aodemisation shall be permitted to go forward in
independence, with ineremsing degrees of hunan freedom, i^e seek
two resultsi first, t^st truly independkmt nations shall emerge
on the world scenei and second, that each nation will be per-
mitted to fashi<m out of its own culture and its own asdsition,
the Kind of modern society it wants. The same religious and
0^
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nphilosophical b«llefs which d«Gr«« that we reiptct tht uniquantss
of «»eh Individual* aaht it natural that na rcapact th« uniquaiiats
of •mch national society.^
From tht prrviouis P«8^» im can s«« tht ntad for Aaarioans to
tsidtrstand tht probltas associated vith gutrrilla varfart in today's
vorld* If this understanding is aehitvad, Uiirt is littlt doubt that
our govtmttnt vill aet vitaly in thtst difficult tiacs and that tht
ptoplt vill provide tht ntadtd backing and support* Thta, w vill havt
good reason to believe that over the next deoade or so the avowed
Cowntaist strategy of inciting and aiding "wars of national liberation**
can be checked and defeated.
^f• W. Bostov, "OuerriUa warfare in Underdeveloped Areas," The
Ouerrilla - And rtav To Fight Hja, Col. T. ». Qreene (ed.) (Vev YorkT^
Frederick A.l^raeger, 1962), p. 56.




CHMXTilla MLrf««%» during th« last quftrter of a ctntuxy, hat
ufxl«rgon« an li^ortant transformation froa a typ« of varfart th« obj«o->
tivas of tfhich vera chi«f ly ailitary to a aoda of conflict tha objactivts
of vhich ara cencaived in a larger political dineftsioii. The Coatttnists
have gleaned aany lessons froa the hlstozy of guerrilla warfare and have
set dovn a strategic doctrine that includes weapons of a political^
military, economic, and psychological nature* As yet, the West has not
devalued a form of defense that is adequate against this type of war»
fare. And even i^re the defense has been effective, the cost to the
Vest of suppressii^ such attaoits has ioeen aany times the cost to the
Caaaunlstj of mounting them. Hbvever, a review of guerrilla warfare,
including its past histoty, present uses, and some acUaal case studies,
does provide us with certain guidelines t^ieh jarovide a ''frameworH*^ for
establishing an ant i- guerrilla policy.
The key to such a policy is tha population, or as Roger Hilsman
more vividly calls it, "the battle for the villages."^ Querrillas, in
Hao T3e*tung*3 vivid image, are fish swimming in a see of people. If
the habitat is friendly, they win| if it is poisonous, they perish.
Querrillas need the active sti^Tport of strategically placed individuals
and groups, primarily for intelligence and communications. In the bulk
iRoger Kilsman's foreword to Oeneral Vo Sg^yen Gimp* 3 book,
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of ttm population, poasivo si^jport suffices, ond to sain this m nunori*
eally neak guerriUa novvacnt can bring mmsy uawpont into plays t«rror»
idoological persuasion, exploitation of srievances, or sioply default of
effective govemntnt* Counter-guerriUa action cm be successful only
to the extant that it deprives the guerrilla of the kind of political,
social, eeonoaic, and psychological envirenaient in ifhieh it can find
nourishaent*
In a strict sense, it aii ^ ^« said that this is no aore than
uhat any strong and just govemasnt should be expected to dot aaintain
law and orderj dispense ^stice| protect the weak a^inst the strong and
the lawless} provide services appropriate to govemaenti and foster a
healtt^^ eoonoay. But conditions in a large part of today's world aake
good govemnent in this classic sense virtually unattainable. Host
guerrilla situations are in those countries in which the threat is
superiaposed on, and is largely an outgrewtb of t^ already iqjpalling
array of problens associated with a developing society. In these
societies, the basic oaladies of poverty, uf^>alanced and dependent
econoBies, and, in soae cases, e?g>losiva population growth are aggra-
vated by the volatile aass enotion of anti*colonialisa and nationalism,
by class and grct4p tensions resulting froa the clash betwMn tradi-
tienalistt and aodernisa, and hy the internal stru^le for power between
rival political groups* >aall wonder that a guerrilla moveaent can
flourish in such surroundings.
The basic problem for these developing countries then is to pre*
vide an environnent vhich will si^ypress rather than encourage guerrilla
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operations. Thi« rtquiret an extansiv* program ranging froa ena end of
th« jpectmai th« military , to the other end, ^he political. Military
considerations are necessary because the new nations need tiae. Ho
agio of science can traasfora their vay of life overnight. The Coa-
onist use of guerrilla operations threatens these developing nations,
and it is unfortunate, but true, that ve siiq»ly cannot depend upon the
slov processes of education and grevth to cotmter this threat. Although
military considerations should not dominate the plans of these countries,
M realistic thought can be given to their development unless they face
\if> to the facts of violence.
At the same time, it oust be reaenbered that the problem of
guerrilla nmrfftre is basically a political one. To attempt to under-
stand it as purely a ailltaxy one is the aost (tengerous kind of over*
flti^lification. Ouerrillas are a syi^tom rather than a cause. Lasting
tueeess requires viable political settlement « and even operational
success over a period of time deaands the proper political fraaevork for
effective military action.
In order for the developing countries to carry out the necessary
programs. Western aid, primarliy from the United ^>tates, is necessary.
This, in turn, brings in nev problems concerning the relationship
beti««ea the United states and the recipient countries. There are no
easy ansvers to these problems. Just as there are no easy answers to
the entire problem of guerrilla warfare. Realism, patience, and under-
standing are necessary in or<tor to make these problems bearable.
This pi^r has been written aj a step toward the better
.1* «
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ttiiderst«nding of gucrrlUa Murfftrt as practiced In thm tventitth c«fk-
tiixy. It offers no easy solutions, ocrtly e freaeworti which wm/, In the
Ions and difficult future, offer the ptossibility of suceese. However,
history has jhovn us that such success i.^ possible and it beN»aves us to
•aHe the necessary effort.
mmi4 nut «! b«^'i^g-ti urn mtfitmi &liirrmfQ %»
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